Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32296735›Full record

ArticleSynthetic and systems biotechnology2020

Prudently conduct the engineering and synthesis of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.

Peng Gao, Shiwen Ma, Daru Lu, Carl Mitcham, Yijia Jing, Guoyu Wang

Erratum issuedAbstract read
PubMed Full text at PMC Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in Synthetic and systems biotechnology, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Review
  3. Article
  4. Review
  5. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Peng GaoThe Human Phenome Institute, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200433, China.
Shiwen MaDepartment of Philosophy, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian, Liaoning, 116024, China.
Daru LuState Key Laboratory of Genetic Engineering and MOE Engineering Research Center of Gene Technology, School of Life Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200433, China.
Carl MitchamRenmin University of China, Beijing, 100872, China.
Yijia JingInstitute for Global Public Policy & School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200433, China.
Guoyu WangSchool of Philosophy, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200433, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In response to the outbreak of COVID-19 that has been sweeping the world, scientists reconstructed the SARS-CoV-2 rapidly using a synthetic genomics platform, in order to accelerate therapeutics and vaccine development. However, given the dual-use nature of this technology, there exists a high biosecurity risk. This paper points out the potential risks of the engineering SARS-CoV-2 virus and puts forward 6 questions to this work. The authors emphasize that the two basic values of safety/security and intellectual freedom of research must be considered evenly. From the perspective of responsible development of biotechnology, this paper calls for a careful assessment to the risks of the technology, replacing risky technologies with safe ones. The risks of publication also need to be strictly assessed. The authors believe, in addition to enhancing the "self-government" and self-discipline of scientists and scientific communities, government supervision must be reinforced, laws and regulations should be improved, and global regulation framework ought to be constructed.

Indexed as

Biosafety/BiosecurityDual-useEngineering SARS-CoV-2 virusRegulationRisk

Identifiers

PMID32296735
PMCPMC7156160

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.