Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32231619›Full record

ReviewFrontiers in psychology2020

Re-wiring Guilt: How Advancing Neuroscience Encourages Strategic Interventions Over Retributive Justice.

Nathaniel E Anderson, Kent A Kiehl

Open access · goldAbstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Frontiers in psychology, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
0.6field-weighted citation impact, top 37% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed, 8 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Nathaniel E AndersonThe Mind Research Network, Albuquerque, NM, United States.
Kent A KiehlThe Mind Research Network, Albuquerque, NM, United States.
Mind Research Network · USUniversity of New Mexico · US

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The increasing visibility of neuroscience employed in legal contexts has rightfully prompted critical discourse regarding the boundaries of its utility. High profile debates include some extreme positions that either undermine the relevance of neuroscience or overstate its role in determining legal responsibility. Here we adopt a conciliatory attitude, reaffirming the current value of neuroscience in jurisprudence and addressing its role in shifting normative attitudes about culpability. Adopting a balanced perspective about the interaction between two dynamic fields (science and law) allows for more fruitful consideration of practical changes likely to improve the way we engage in legal decision-making. Neuroscience provides a useful platform for addressing nuanced and multifaceted deterministic factors promoting antisocial behavior. Ultimately, we suggest that shifting normative attitudes about culpability vis-à-vis advancing neuroscience are not likely to promote major changes in the way we assign legal responsibility. Rather, it helps us to shed our harshest retributivist instincts in favor of more pragmatic strategies for combating the most conspicuous patterns promoting mass incarceration and recidivism.

Indexed as

culpabilitydeterminismfree willinterventionjurisprudenceneurolawneuroscience

Identifiers

PMID32231619
PMCPMC7082751
OpenAlexW3010707442

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.