Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32120950›Full record

ArticleInternational journal of environmental research and public health2020

Environmental Governance Cooperative Behavior among Enterprises with Reputation Effect Based on Complex Networks Evolutionary Game Model.

Ming Luo, Ruguo Fan, Yingqing Zhang, Chaoping Zhu

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in International journal of environmental research and public health, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Public Voice via Social Media: Role in Cooperative Governance during Public Health Emergency.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2020
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Ming LuoEconomics and Management School, Guangxi Normal University, Guilin 541000, China.
Ruguo FanEconomics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China.
Yingqing ZhangSchool of Management Science and engineering, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang 550025, China.
Chaoping ZhuEconomics and Management School, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

This paper first portrays the equilibrium payoff of enterprise's cooperation of environmental governance based on the Cournot model. Secondly, the evolutionary game model in complex networks is adopted to depict the evolution of environmental governance cooperative behavior among enterprises. Further, the evolutionary process of environmental governance cooperative behavior of enterprises is simulated considering the supervision behavior of government and the reputation evaluation behavior of environmental social organization. The results show that the cooperation level of enterprise group under self-organization condition will reach a low level; the supervision of government can enhance the cooperation level of enterprise group with high betrayal tempatation while it has limited effect on enterprise group with low betrayal tempatation. The reputation evaluation behavior of environmental social organization can realize reputation effect to improve the the cooperation level of enterprise group with high betrayal tempatation. The enhance of reputation sensitivity can optimize equilibrium distribution of reputation and it can strengthen the reputation effect on cooperation level. Based on the analysis above, the suggestions to effectively improve cooperation level are given.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorEnvironmental PolicyGame TheoryConservation of Natural Resourcescooperative behaviorenvironmental governanceevolutionary game model in complex networksreputation effect

Identifiers

PMID32120950
PMCPMC7084848

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.