ArticleNature communications2020
Evolutionary games with environmental feedbacks.
Article in Nature communications, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 53 papers.
What it found
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Who cites it
53 citing papers in PubMed.
- From rule-taking to rule-making chemistry: a minimal population-environment feedback model.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2026Article
- Pattern Formation in a Spatial Public Goods Dilemma due to Diffusive or Directed Motion.Bulletin of mathematical biology · 2026Article
- Cooperation, Defection, and Collapse: A Multiscale Game Theory Framework for Emphysema Progression.Cells · 2026Review
- Why there are so many definitions of fitness in models.Genetics · 2026Review
- Detection and countermeasure integrated framework against false data injection attacks in multi-area coupled power systems.Nature communications · 2026Article
- Evolutionary path from a prisoner's dilemma to a harmony game via hawk-dove games.Scientific reports · 2026Article
- The Evolutionary and Ecological Consequences of Cooperation.The American naturalist · 2026Review
- Ecological inheritance facilitates the coexistence of environmental helpers and free riders.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026Article
- Pattern Formation in Agent-Based and PDE Models for Evolutionary Games with Payoff-Driven Motion.Bulletin of mathematical biology · 2026Article
- Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation, risk, and cost in collective risk games.PLoS computational biology · 2026Article
- The key role of cheaters in the persistence of cooperation.BMC biology · 2026Article
- Tripartite evolutionary game analysis of medical data governance: interactions among government, medical institutions, and third-party assessment agencies.Frontiers in public health · 2026Article
- Phase separation and coexistence in spatial coordination games between microbes.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2025Article
- Impact of resource availability and conformity effect on sustainability of common-pool resources.Fundamental research · 2025Article
- Majority illusion drives the spontaneous emergence of alternative states in common-pool resource games with network-based information.iScience · 2025Article
- Collective cooperative intelligence.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- Self-organized institutions in evolutionary dynamical-systems games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- An evolutionary game theory for event-driven ecological population dynamics.Theory in biosciences = Theorie in den Biowissenschaften · 2025Article
- Empirical evidence of resource dependent evolution of payoff matrices in Saccharomyces cerevisiae populations.Journal of evolutionary biology · 2025Article
- Cooperative environmental engineering via biofilm formation can stabilize consumer-resource systems.PloS one · 2025Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Strategic interactions arise in all domains of life. This form of competition often plays out in dynamically changing environments. The strategies employed in a population may alter the state of the environment, which may in turn feedback to change the incentive structure of strategic interactions. Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological systems, evolutionary-ecological systems, and even psychological-economic systems. Here we develop a framework of 'eco-evolutionary game theory' that enables the study of strategic and environmental dynamics with feedbacks. We consider environments governed either by intrinsic growth, decay, or tipping points. We show how the joint dynamics of strategies and the environment depend on the incentives for individuals to lead or follow behavioral changes, and on the relative speed of environmental versus strategic change. Our analysis unites dynamical phenomena that occur in settings as diverse as human decision-making, plant nutrient acquisition, and resource harvesting. We discuss implications in fields ranging from ecology to economics.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.