Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32034572›Full record

ArticleMedicine, health care, and philosophy2020

Moral distress in health care: when is it fitting?

Lisa Tessman

Abstract read
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In one paragraph

Article in Medicine, health care, and philosophy, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed
3.2field-weighted citation impact, top 7% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed, 22 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. The moral significance of moral distress.Medicine, health care, and philosophy · 2026
    Review
  2. Article
  3. The American journal of bioethics : AJOB · 2025
    Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author at 1 institution in 1 country.

Lisa TessmanPhilosophy Department, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, 13902, USA. Ltessman@binghamton.edu.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-6446-9583
Binghamton University · US

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Nurses and other medical practitioners often experience moral distress: they feel an anguished sense of responsibility for what they take to be their own moral failures, even when those failures were unavoidable. However, in such cases other people do not tend to think it is right to hold them responsible. This is an interesting mismatch of reactions. It might seem that the mismatch should be remedied by assuring the practitioner that they are not responsible, but I argue that this denies something important that the phenomenon of moral distress tells us. In fact, both the practitioners' tendencies to hold themselves responsible and other people's reluctance to hold the practitioners responsible get something right. The practitioners may be right that they are responsible in the sense of having failed to meet a binding moral requirement, even when the requirement was impossible to meet. This makes moral distress a fitting response because it correctly represents their own action as a wrongdoing. However, others may meanwhile be right that the practitioners are not responsible in the sense of being culpable and blameworthy. To blame others, or oneself, for certain failures, including those that are unavoidable, would be unfair. My claim depends on distinguishing between the fittingness and the fairness of holding someone (including oneself) responsible for moral failure. Having drawn the distinction, I suggest that moral distress should be addressed in a way that both recognizes it as a fitting response and avoids the unfairness of blame.

Indexed as

MoralsClinical ReasoningEthics, ClinicalHealth PersonnelHumansPhilosophy, MedicalProfessional RoleStress, PsychologicalFittingnessMoral dilemmasMoral distressMoral failureMoralistic fallacyReactive attitudes

Identifiers

PMID32034572
OpenAlexW3005345428

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.