Evidence map›Paper›PMID 32028090›Full record

Trial reportJournal of health economics2020

In-kind incentives and health worker performance: Experimental evidence from El Salvador.

Pedro Bernal, Sebastian Martinez

Abstract readRandomized Controlled Trial
In one paragraph

Trial report in Journal of health economics, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Article
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  8. Review
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Pedro BernalInter-American Development Bank, 1300 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20577, United States. Electronic address: pbernallara@iadb.org.
Sebastian MartinezInter-American Development Bank, 1300 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20577, United States. Electronic address: smartinez@iadb.org.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

We experimentally evaluated the effects of in-kind team incentives on health worker performance in El Salvador, with 38 out of 75 community health teams randomly assigned to performance incentives over a 12-month period. All teams received monitoring, performance feedback and recognition for their achievements allowing us to isolate the effect of the incentive. While both treatment and control groups exhibit improvements in performance measures over time, the in-kind incentives generated significant improvements in community outreach, quality of care, timeliness of care, and utilization of maternal and child health services after 12 months. Gains were largest for teams at the bottom and top of the baseline performance distribution. We find no evidence of results being driven by changes in reporting or by shifting away effort from non-contracted outcomes. These results suggest that in-kind team incentives may be a viable alternative to monetary or individual incentives in certain contexts.

Indexed as

Health PersonnelMotivationWork PerformanceEl SalvadorFemaleHumansMaleSurveys and QuestionnairesEl SalvadorHealth servicesIn-kindPay for performancePerformance incentivesTeam incentives

Identifiers

PMID32028090
PMCPMC7188218

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.