Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31969381›Full record

ReviewTobacco control2020

Tobacco manufacturer lobbying to undercut minimum price laws: an analysis of internal industry documents.

Dorie E Apollonio, Stanton Glantz

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Tobacco control, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Trial
  2. Article
  3. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Dorie E ApollonioDepartment of Clinical Pharmacy, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, California, USA dorie.apollonio@ucsf.edu.ORCID 0000-0003-4694-0826
Stanton GlantzCenter for Tobacco Control Research and Education, University of California, San Francisco, California, USA.ORCID 0000-0003-4620-6672

Funding

ANALYSIS OF TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTSR01CA087472 · NCI · UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO · PI LING, PAMELA MAY · 2000 to 2018
$12.5M
NCI NIH HHS R01 CA087472
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundIncreasing the price of tobacco products has the potential to reduce tobacco consumption. As other forms of promotion have been increasingly restricted over time, tobacco manufacturers have relied more on trade discounts. Minimum price laws that prevented the use of manufacturer promotions were once common; however in most US jurisdictions these discounts are now legally protected.

methodsWe collected tobacco industry documents, state legislation and court cases between 1987 and 2016 to review tobacco manufacturer strategies to change minimum price laws in the USA.

resultsBeginning in 2000, tobacco manufacturers lobbied to amend minimum price legislation after state regulators indicated that manufacturer promotions were illegal under existing laws. Companies viewed changing these laws as critical to maintaining tobacco sales, and after the initiation of an industry lobbying campaign, at least 20 states changed the way they calculated tobacco prices.

conclusionsModifying existing minimum price laws so that manufacturer discounts are no longer protected, and implementing new minimum price policies with comparable scope, would likely increase prices and reduce tobacco use.

Indexed as

Tobacco IndustryTobacco ProductsCommerceHumansLobbyingTobacco Useadvertising and promotionadvocacypricepublic policytobacco industry documents

Identifiers

PMID31969381
PMCPMC7374022

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.