Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31920868›Full record

ReviewFrontiers in psychology2019

How to Mitigate the Hard Problem by Adopting the Dual Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness.

Michal Polák, Tomáš Marvan

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Frontiers in psychology, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Michal PolákDepartment of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czechia.
Tomáš MarvanDepartment of Analytic Philosophy, The Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, Prague, Czechia.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In this paper, we propose the following hypothesis: the hard problem of consciousness is in part an artifact of what we call the unitary approach to phenomenal consciousness. The defining mark of the unitary approach is that it views consciousness and phenomenality as inseparable. Giving up this conceptual commitment redefines, in a productive way, the explanatory tasks of the theory of consciousness. Adopting a non-unitary conception of experience does not make the hard problem of consciousness go away completely but it shifts the locus of where the explanation of experience gets difficult, and cuts down the mystery of consciousness to size. Other advantages of the non-unitary account of consciousness are sketched as well.

Indexed as

consciousnesshard problemphenomenal consciousnessphenomenalityunconscious phenomenality

Identifiers

PMID31920868
PMCPMC6927938

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.