Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31917806›Full record

ArticlePloS one2020

Perceived relative social status and cognitive load influence acceptance of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game.

Alison Harris, Aleena Young, Livia Hughson, Danielle Green, Stacey N Doan, Eric Hughson, Catherine L Reed

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

7 authors.

Alison HarrisDepartment of Psychological Science, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0002-0559-2821
Aleena YoungDepartment of Psychological Science, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California, United States of America.
Livia HughsonThe Webb Schools, Claremont, California, United States of America.
Danielle GreenDivision of Behavioral & Social Sciences, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, California, United States of America.
Stacey N DoanDepartment of Psychological Science, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California, United States of America.
Eric HughsonRobert Day School of Economics & Finance, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California, United States of America.
Catherine L ReedDepartment of Psychological Science, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, California, United States of America.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Participants in the Ultimatum Game will often reject unfair resource allocations at personal cost, reflecting a trade-off between financial gain and maintenance of social standing. Although this rejection behavior is linked to executive control, the exact role of cognitive regulation in relation to status cues is unclear. We propose that the salience of status cues affects how cognitive regulation resolves the conflict between financial gain and social status considerations. Situations that tax executive control by limiting available cognitive resources should increase acceptance rates for unfair offers, particularly when the conflict between economic self-interest and social reputation is high. Here, participants rated their own subjective social status, and then either mentally counted (Load) or ignored (No Load) simultaneously-presented tones while playing two rounds of the Ultimatum Game with an online (sham) "Proposer" of either high or low social status. A logistic regression revealed an interaction of Proposer status with cognitive load. Compared to the No Load group, the Load group showed higher acceptance rates for unfair offers from the high-status Proposer. In contrast, cognitive load did not influence acceptance rates for unfair offers from the low-status Proposer. Additionally, Proposer status interacted with the relative social distance between participant and Proposer. Participants close in social distance to the high-status Proposer were more likely to accept the unfair offer than those farther in social distance, whereas the opposite pattern was observed for offers from the low-status Proposer. Although rejection of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game has previously been conceptualized as an intuitive response, these results instead suggest it reflects a deliberative strategy, dependent on cognitive resources, to prioritize social standing over short-term financial gain. This study reveals the dynamic interplay of cognitive resources and status concerns within this paradigm, providing new insights into when and why people reject inequitable divisions of resources.

Indexed as

Decision MakingPsychological DistanceResource AllocationSocial ClassCognitionFemaleGames, ExperimentalHumansMaleYoung Adult

Identifiers

PMID31917806
PMCPMC6952087

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.