Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31880231›Full record

ArticleJournal of managed care & specialty pharmacy2020

Examining Misaligned Incentives for Payers and Manufacturers in Value-Based Pharmaceutical Contracts.

Joseph T Kannarkat, Chester B Good, Erin Kelly, Natasha Parekh

Open access · bronzeAbstract readComparative Study
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of managed care & specialty pharmacy, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
1.6field-weighted citation impact, top 9% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 8 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.

Joseph T KannarkatDepartment of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom.
Chester B GoodUPMC Centers for Value-Based Pharmacy Initiatives and High-Value Health Care, UPMC Insurance Services Division, and University of Pittsburgh Division of General Internal Medicine, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Erin KellyUniversity of Pittsburgh Division of General Internal Medicine, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Natasha ParekhUPMC Centers for Value-Based Pharmacy Initiatives and High-Value Health Care, UPMC Insurance Services Division, and University of Pittsburgh Division of General Internal Medicine, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
University of Cambridge · GB

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Value-based pharmaceutical contracts (VBPCs) are performance-based reimbursement agreements between health care payers and pharmaceutical manufacturers in which the price, quantity, or nature of reimbursement is tied to value-based outcomes. As value-based payment models have permeated through much of the health care payment landscape via reimbursement to payers and providers, VBPCs offer opportunities for manufacturers to similarly engage in performance-based models. This article compares 2 VBPC schemes: "pay-for-failure" schemes, in which manufacturers offer rebates or discounts to payers for treatment failure, and "pay-for-success" schemes, in which manufacturers offer rebates or discounts to payers for treatment success. Each method has its own short-term and long-term trade-offs, and both lead to some degree of misaligned incentives between payers and manufacturers. These incentive differences have important downstream effects, influencing patient selection, provision of wraparound services, and nature of reimbursements. This analysis contrasts potential benefits and disadvantages for each of these approaches and offers potential solutions to address misalignment. For example, although pay-for-success models may be more aligned between payers and manufacturers, pay-for-failure contracts can be innovative and effective in controlling costs and/or improving outcomes. To illustrate, VBPCs aimed to reduce costs could incorporate total cost of care reduction as a value-based outcome. The authors encourage payers and manufacturers to consider a blended alternative where pay-for-failure and pay-for-success outcomes could be incorporated as VBPC outcomes. Since little is known about the effect of each scheme on outcomes, further research on VBPCs is necessary to fully understand how differing incentives ultimately affect clinical outcomes and costs. DISCLOSURES: No outside funding supported the writing of this article. Good and Kelly are employed by the UPMC Centers for Value-Based Pharmacy Initiatives and High-Value Health Care, and Parekh was employed by the UPMC Centers for Value-Based Pharmacy Initiatives and High-Value Health Care at the time of this study. The authors have no other disclosures to report.

Indexed as

Drug CostsPolicy MakingCost-Benefit AnalysisCost SharingDrug IndustryHumansInsurance, Pharmaceutical ServicesManaged Care ProgramsPharmaceutical ServicesReimbursement, IncentiveTreatment FailureValue-Based Health Insurance

Identifiers

PMID31880231
PMCPMC10390966
OpenAlexW2998412167

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.