ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2019
Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions.
Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 25 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
25 citing papers in PubMed.
- Coupling with opinion dynamics promotes prosocial behavior in multilayer networks.PLoS computational biology · 2026Article
- Coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation, risk, and cost in collective risk games.PLoS computational biology · 2026Article
- Individual incentives that promote collective intelligence.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- A multi-agent reinforcement learning framework for exploring dominant strategies in iterated and evolutionary games.Nature communications · 2025Article
- Impact of resource availability and conformity effect on sustainability of common-pool resources.Fundamental research · 2025Article
- Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
- Cultural tightness and resilience against environmental shocks in nonindustrial societies.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Investigating the impact of environmental feedback on the optional prisoner's dilemma for insights into cyclic dominance and evolution of cooperation.Royal Society open science · 2024Article
- Behavioural strategies in simultaneous and alternating prisoner's dilemma games with/without voluntary participation.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- The evolution of social behaviors and risk preferences in settings with uncertainty.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024Article
- Evolutionary dynamics of any multiplayer game on regular graphs.Nature communications · 2024Article
- Adaptations to infer fitness interdependence promote the evolution of cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023Article
- Evolutionary dynamics on sequential temporal networks.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- Nonlinear eco-evolutionary games with global environmental fluctuations and local environmental feedbacks.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- Article
- Article
- A game-based approach for designing a collaborative evolution mechanism for unmanned swarms on community networks.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Interaction between games give rise to the evolution of moral norms of cooperation.PLoS computational biology · 2022Article
- Evolution of cooperation with joint liability.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2022Article
- Evolution of prosocial behaviours in multilayer populations.Nature human behaviour · 2022Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
The environment has a strong influence on a population's evolutionary dynamics. Driven by both intrinsic and external factors, the environment is subject to continual change in nature. To capture an ever-changing environment, we consider a model of evolutionary dynamics with game transitions, where individuals' behaviors together with the games that they play in one time step influence the games to be played in the next time step. Within this model, we study the evolution of cooperation in structured populations and find a simple rule: Weak selection favors cooperation over defection if the ratio of the benefit provided by an altruistic behavior, b, to the corresponding cost, c, exceeds [Formula: see text], where k is the average number of neighbors of an individual and [Formula: see text] captures the effects of the game transitions. Even if cooperation cannot be favored in each individual game, allowing for a transition to a relatively valuable game after mutual cooperation and to a less valuable game after defection can result in a favorable outcome for cooperation. In particular, small variations in different games being played can promote cooperation markedly. Our results suggest that simple game transitions can serve as a mechanism for supporting prosocial behaviors in highly connected populations.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.