Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31725758›Full record

Trial reportPloS one2019

Self-serving incentives impair collective decisions by increasing conformity.

Sepideh Bazazi, Jorina von Zimmermann, Bahador Bahrami, Daniel Richardson

Abstract readClinical Trial
In one paragraph

Trial report in PloS one, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Derationalizing Delusions.Clinical psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science · 2021
    Review
  7. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Sepideh BazaziIndependent researcher, London, United Kingdom.ORCID 0000-0002-1549-0490
Jorina von ZimmermannDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
Bahador BahramiInstitute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London, London, United Kingdom.
Daniel RichardsonDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University College London, London, United Kingdom.

Funding

Wellcome TrustWellcome Trust 105128/Z/14/Z
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The average judgment of large numbers of people has been found to be consistently better than the best individual response. But what motivates individuals when they make collective decisions? While it is a popular belief that individual incentives promote out-of-the-box thinking and diverse solutions, the exact role of motivation and reward in collective intelligence remains unclear. Here we examined collective intelligence in an interactive group estimation task where participants were rewarded for their individual or group's performance. In addition to examining individual versus collective incentive structures, we controlled whether participants could see social information about the others' responses. We found that knowledge about others' responses reduced the wisdom of the crowd and, crucially, this effect depended on how people were rewarded. When rewarded for the accuracy of their individual responses, participants converged to the group mean, increasing social conformity, reducing diversity and thereby diminishing their group wisdom. When rewarded for their collective performance, diversity of opinions and the group wisdom increased. We conclude that the intuitive association between individual incentives and individualist opinion needs revising.

Indexed as

KnowledgeSocial BehaviorAdolescentAdultDecision MakingFemaleHumansIntelligenceJudgmentMaleMotivation

Identifiers

PMID31725758
PMCPMC6855459

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.