Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31704922›Full record

ArticleNature communications2019

Evolutionary games on isothermal graphs.

Benjamin Allen, Gabor Lippner, Martin A Nowak

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Nature communications, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 13 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
13citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

13 citing papers in PubMed.

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  5. Sharp thresholds limit the benefit of defector avoidance in cooperation on networks.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2022
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Benjamin AllenDepartment of Mathematics, Emmanuel College, 400 The Fenway, Boston, MA, 02115, USA. allenb@emmanuel.edu.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9746-7613
Gabor LippnerDepartment of Mathematics, Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Ave, Boston, MA, 02115, USA.
Martin A NowakProgram for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, One Brattle Square, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Population structure affects the outcome of natural selection. These effects can be modeled using evolutionary games on graphs. Recently, conditions were derived for a trait to be favored under weak selection, on any weighted graph, in terms of coalescence times of random walks. Here we consider isothermal graphs, which have the same total edge weight at each node. The conditions for success on isothermal graphs take a simple form, in which the effects of graph structure are captured in the 'effective degree'-a measure of the effective number of neighbors per individual. For two update rules (death-Birth and birth-Death), cooperative behavior is favored on a large isothermal graph if the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds the effective degree. For two other update rules (Birth-death and Death-birth), cooperation is never favored. We relate the effective degree of a graph to its spectral gap, thereby linking evolutionary dynamics to the theory of expander graphs. Surprisingly, we find graphs of infinite average degree that nonetheless provide strong support for cooperation.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorModels, TheoreticalPopulation DynamicsSelection, GeneticBiological EvolutionComputer SimulationDemographyGame TheoryHumansSocial Behavior

Identifiers

PMID31704922
PMCPMC6841731

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.