ArticleScientific reports2019
Reward and punishment in climate change dilemmas.
Article in Scientific reports, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 21 papers.
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Who cites it
21 citing papers in PubMed.
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- Emergence of cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's dilemma through Discriminatory and Samaritan AIs.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024Article
- Cost Optimisation of Individual-Based Institutional Reward Incentives for Promoting Cooperation in Finite Populations.Bulletin of mathematical biology · 2024Article
- Individual low-carbon behaviors and influencing factors: Insights from a behavior survey study in China.Heliyon · 2024Article
- Cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations.Journal of mathematical biology · 2023Article
- Evolution of conditional cooperation in collective-risk social dilemma with repeated group interactions.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2023Article
- Does Spending More Always Ensure Higher Cooperation? An Analysis of Institutional Incentives on Heterogeneous Networks.Dynamic games and applications · 2023Article
- Exploring the entropic nature of political polarization through its formulation as a isolated thermodynamic system.Scientific reports · 2023Article
- Delegation to artificial agents fosters prosocial behaviors in the collective risk dilemma.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- The probabilistic pool punishment proportional to the difference of payoff outperforms previous pool and peer punishment.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Institutional incentives for the evolution of committed cooperation: ensuring participation is as important as enhancing compliance.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2022Article
- Cooperation dynamics under pandemic risks and heterogeneous economic interdependence.Chaos, solitons, and fractals · 2022Article
- Cost efficiency of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2021Article
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- Biased perceptions explain collective action deadlocks and suggest new mechanisms to prompt cooperation.iScience · 2021Article
- A collective risk dilemma for tourism restrictions under the COVID-19 context.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- An epidemiological model with voluntary quarantine strategies governed by evolutionary game dynamics.Chaos, solitons, and fractals · 2021Article
- Mediating artificial intelligence developments through negative and positive incentives.PloS one · 2021Article
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Mitigating climate change effects involves strategic decisions by individuals that may choose to limit their emissions at a cost. Everyone shares the ensuing benefits and thereby individuals can free ride on the effort of others, which may lead to the tragedy of the commons. For this reason, climate action can be conveniently formulated in terms of Public Goods Dilemmas often assuming that a minimum collective effort is required to ensure any benefit, and that decision-making may be contingent on the risk associated with future losses. Here we investigate the impact of reward and punishment in this type of collective endeavors - coined as collective-risk dilemmas - by means of a dynamic, evolutionary approach. We show that rewards (positive incentives) are essential to initiate cooperation, mostly when the perception of risk is low. On the other hand, we find that sanctions (negative incentives) are instrumental to maintain cooperation. Altogether, our results are gratifying, given the a-priori limitations of effectively implementing sanctions in international agreements. Finally, we show that whenever collective action is most challenging to succeed, the best results are obtained when both rewards and sanctions are synergistically combined into a single policy.
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