ArticleRoyal Society open science2019
Bound to the group and blinded by the leader: ideological leader-follower dynamics in a trust economic game.
Article in Royal Society open science, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.
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Who cites it
5 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.
- Trust learning in the repeated trust game: A meta-analytic study.British journal of psychology (London, England : 1953) · 2026Pooled it
- Trust in government moderates the association between fear of COVID-19 as well as empathic concern and preventive behaviour.Communications psychology · 2023Article
- Competence-based social status and implicit preference modulate the ability to coordinate during a joint grasping task.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- Oculomotor behavior tracks the effect of ideological priming on deception.Scientific reports · 2020Article
- Modulation of preference for abstract stimuli following competence-based social status primes.Experimental brain research · 2020Article
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5 authors.
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Abstract
Understanding the dynamics of trustworthiness in ideological contexts could influence human societies, affect electoral campaigns and ultimately impact democracy. We tested trust behaviour towards political leaders in a sample of 121 opposing/supporting voters assigned as trustors in an iterative trust game (TG). In two experiments, a famous Italian conservative leader (i.e. Silvio Berlusconi) or a famous non-politician were used as trustees in a predefined un/trustworthy TG, while trustors believed that mathematical algorithms reproduced trustee's real behaviour. Results revealed that depending on the group, voters either relied on the situation and adjusted to the behaviour of the out-group leader (in our case left-wing voters), or on their disposition for group-loyalty with respect for authority, thus failing to adjust to the behaviour of the in-group leader (in our case right-wing voters). Our findings suggest that: (i) complex voter-leader relations in politics are reflected in the simple trustor-trustee financial interactions from behavioural economics, and (ii) being bound to one's group and one's leader may affect the trust economic decisions of the followers.
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