Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31570582›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2019

Great apes use self-experience to anticipate an agent's action in a false-belief test.

Fumihiro Kano, Christopher Krupenye, Satoshi Hirata, Masaki Tomonaga, Josep Call

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 44 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
44citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

44 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Re-evaluating Theory of Mind evaluation in large language models.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2025
    Article
  4. Reply to Royka and Santos: Representing ignorance, and the evolution of theory of mind.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Evaluating large language models in theory of mind tasks.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  9. Review
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Bonobos and chimpanzees remember familiar conspecifics for decades.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
    Article
  14. Overcoming bias in the comparison of human language and animal communication.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2023
    Article
  15. Article
  16. Review
  17. Communication for collaborative computation: two major transitions in human evolution.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2023
    Review
  18. Animal linguistics: a primer.Biological reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society · 2023
    Article
  19. Review
  20. Canine perspective-taking.Animal cognition · 2023
    Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Fumihiro KanoKumamoto Sanctuary, Wildlife Research Center, Kyoto University, 869-3201 Kumamoto, Japan; fkanou@gmail.com.ORCID 0000-0003-4534-6630
Christopher KrupenyeSchool of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, KY16 9JP St Andrews, United Kingdom.ORCID 0000-0003-2029-1872
Satoshi HirataKumamoto Sanctuary, Wildlife Research Center, Kyoto University, 869-3201 Kumamoto, Japan.
Masaki TomonagaPrimate Research Institute, Kyoto University, 484-8506 Inuyama, Japan.
Josep CallSchool of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, KY16 9JP St Andrews, United Kingdom.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Human social life depends on theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others. A signature of theory of mind, false belief understanding, requires representing others' views of the world, even when they conflict with one's own. After decades of research, it remains controversial whether any nonhuman species possess a theory of mind. One challenge to positive evidence of animal theory of mind, the behavior-rule account, holds that animals solve such tasks by responding to others' behavioral cues rather than their mental states. We distinguish these hypotheses by implementing a version of the "goggles" test, which asks whether, in the absence of any additional behavioral cues, animals can use their own self-experience of a novel barrier being translucent or opaque to determine whether another agent can see through the same barrier. We incorporated this paradigm into an established anticipatory-looking false-belief test for great apes. In a between-subjects design, apes experienced a novel barrier as either translucent or opaque, although both looked identical from afar. While being eye tracked, all apes then watched a video in which an actor saw an object hidden under 1 of 2 identical boxes. The actor then scuttled behind the novel barrier, at which point the object was relocated and then removed. Only apes who experienced the barrier as opaque visually anticipated that the actor would mistakenly search for the object in its previous location. Great apes, therefore, appeared to attribute differential visual access based specifically on their own past perceptual experience to anticipate an agent's actions in a false-belief test.

Indexed as

AnimalsBehavior, AnimalComprehensionCuesCultureFemaleHominidaeMaleTheory of Mindanticipatory lookingbehavior rulegoggles testnonhuman animalstheory of mind

Identifiers

PMID31570582
PMCPMC6800361

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.