Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31529343›Full record

ArticleThe European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care2020

Global budget versus cost ceiling: a natural experiment in hospital payment reform in the Netherlands.

Katalin Gaspar, France Portrait, Eric van der Hijden, Xander Koolman

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care, 2020. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
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  4. Length of hospital stays and financial incentives: evidence from Dutch rehabilitation centers.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2024
    Article
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  10. Do budget constraints limit access to health care? Evidence from PCI treatments in Hungary.International journal of health economics and management · 2023
    Article
  11. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Katalin GasparDepartment of Health Sciences, Health Economics Section, Talma Institute/VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. k.gaspar@vu.nl.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0072-6165
France PortraitDepartment of Health Sciences, Health Economics Section, Talma Institute/VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Eric van der HijdenDepartment of Health Sciences, Health Economics Section, Talma Institute/VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Xander KoolmanDepartment of Health Sciences, Health Economics Section, Talma Institute/VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Global budget (GB) arrangements have become a popular method worldwide to control the rise in healthcare expenditures. By guaranteeing hospital funding, payers hope to eliminate the drive for increased production, and incentivize providers to deliver more efficient care and lower utilization. We evaluated the introduction of GB contracts by certain large insurers in Dutch hospital care in 2012 and compared health care utilization to those insurers who continued with more traditional production-based contracts, i.e., cost ceiling (CC) contracts. We used the share of GB hospital funding per postal code region to study the effect of contract types. Our findings show that having higher share of GB financing was associated with lower growth in treatment intensity, but it was also associated with higher growth in the probability of having at least one hospital visit. While the former finding is in line with our expectation, the latter is not and suggests that hospital visits may take longer to respond to contract incentives. Our study covers the years of 2010-2013 (2 years before and 2 years following the introduction of the new contracts). Therefore, our results capture only short-term effects.

Indexed as

Cost ControlEconomics, HospitalHealth Care ReformHospital AdministrationHumansInsurance Claim ReviewNetherlandsPhysiciansReimbursement MechanismsGlobal budgetPolicy evaluationProvider incentiveProvider paymentRegulated competitionThe Netherlands

Identifiers

PMID31529343
PMCPMC7058687

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.