Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31528360›Full record

ArticleNeuroscience of consciousness2019

Perceptual awareness and active inference.

Thomas Parr, Andrew W Corcoran, Karl J Friston, Jakob Hohwy

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Neuroscience of consciousness, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 31 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
31citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

31 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. The Game of Self: Identity and Experience as Active Inference.Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc · 2026
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  2. Review
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  4. Article
  5. Review
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  11. Mechanisms of brain self-regulation: psychological factors, mechanistic models and neural substrates.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2024
    Review
  12. Review
  13. The Universal Optimism of the Self-Evidencing Mind.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2024
    Article
  14. Review
  15. Bistable perception, precision and neuromodulation.Cerebral cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991) · 2024
    Article
  16. Article
  17. Review
  18. Article
  19. Theories of consciousness.Nature reviews. Neuroscience · 2022
    Review
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Thomas ParrWellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, Institute of Neurology, 12 Queen Square, London, UK.ORCID 0000-0001-5108-5743
Andrew W CorcoranCognition & Philosophy Laboratory, Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.
Karl J FristonWellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, University College London, Institute of Neurology, 12 Queen Square, London, UK.
Jakob HohwyCognition & Philosophy Laboratory, Department of Philosophy, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.ORCID 0000-0003-3906-3060

Funding

Wellcome Trust
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Perceptual awareness depends upon the way in which we engage with our sensorium. This notion is central to active inference, a theoretical framework that treats perception and action as inferential processes. This variational perspective on cognition formalizes the notion of perception as hypothesis testing and treats actions as experiments that are designed (in part) to gather evidence for or against alternative hypotheses. The common treatment of perception and action affords a useful interpretation of certain perceptual phenomena whose active component is often not acknowledged. In this article, we start by considering Troxler fading - the dissipation of a peripheral percept during maintenance of fixation, and its recovery during free (saccadic) exploration. This offers an important example of the failure to maintain a percept without actively interrogating a visual scene. We argue that this may be understood in terms of the accumulation of uncertainty about a hypothesized stimulus when free exploration is disrupted by experimental instructions or pathology. Once we take this view, we can generalize the idea of using bodily (oculomotor) action to resolve uncertainty to include the use of mental (attentional) actions for the same purpose. This affords a useful way to think about binocular rivalry paradigms, in which perceptual changes need not be associated with an overt movement.

Indexed as

active inferenceawarenessBayesianbinocular rivalryTroxler fading

Identifiers

PMID31528360
PMCPMC6734140

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.