Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31440856›Full record

ArticleThe European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care2019

Modest risk-sharing significantly reduces health plans' incentives for service distortion.

Shuli Brammli-Greenberg, Jacob Glazer, Ruth Waitzberg

Abstract read
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In one paragraph

Article in The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Opportunities for diversifying and enriching our article mix.Israel journal of health policy research · 2020
    Article
  5. Selection in Health Insurance Markets and Its Policy Remedies.The journal of economic perspectives : a journal of the American Economic Association
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Shuli Brammli-GreenbergMyers-JDC Brookdale Institute and The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel. shuli@jdc.org.
Jacob GlazerThe University of Warwick and Faculty of Management, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
Ruth WaitzbergMyers-JDC Brookdale Institute, Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel.

Funding

Israel National Institute for Health Policy Research 2012/37
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Public payers often use payment mechanisms as a way to improve the efficiency of the healthcare system. One source of inefficiency is service distortion (SD) in which health plans over/underprovide services in order to affect the mix of their enrollees. Using Israeli data, we apply a new measure of SD to show that a mixed payment scheme, with a modest level of cost-sharing, yields a significant improvement over a pure risk-adjustment scheme. This observation implies that even though mixed systems induce overprovision of some services, their benefits far outweigh their costs.

Indexed as

Choice BehaviorCost SharingDelivery of Health CareReimbursement, IncentiveAdolescentAdultAgedAged, 80 and overChildChild, PreschoolFemaleHumansInfantInfant, NewbornMaleManaged Care ProgramsAdverse selectionCapitationManaged careManaged competitionPayment mechanismsRisk-adjustmentRisk-sharingService distortion

Identifiers

PMID31440856

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.