Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31417730›Full record

ArticleRoyal Society open science2019

Players acting as leaders in turn improve cooperation.

Pu-Yan Nie, Chan Wang, Ting Cui

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Royal Society open science, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
3.7field-weighted citation impact, top 6% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed, 10 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Cooperative green innovation.Environmental science and pollution research international · 2022
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors at 2 institutions in 1 country.

Pu-Yan NieInstitute of Guangdong Economy and Social Development, School of Finance, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics (GDUFE), 510320 Guangzhou, People's Republic of China.ORCID 0000-0002-6214-5980
Chan WangInstitute of Guangdong Economy and Social Development, School of Finance, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics (GDUFE), 510320 Guangzhou, People's Republic of China.
Ting CuiSchool of Accounting, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics (GDUFE), 510320 Guangzhou, People's Republic of China.
Guangdong University of Finance · CNGuangdong University Of Finances and Economics · CN

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Cooperation behaviour is an important topic in society as well as in the biological field, and many factors yield cooperation. Many social phenomena constitute Stackelberg games, but there is little literature on the relationship between Stackelberg games and cooperation. This article shows that in the repeated dynamic Stackelberg games, players acting as leaders in turn yields cooperation. Moreover, social welfare is improved correspondingly when players act as leaders in turn. Therefore, for dynamic Stackelberg games, this paper proposes that the institution of players acting as leaders in turn promotes cooperation.

Indexed as

cooperationdynamic gameleaders in turnStackelberg games

Identifiers

PMID31417730
PMCPMC6689593
OpenAlexW2961035815

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.