Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31199825›Full record

ArticlePloS one2019

Health system capacity in Sydney, Australia in the event of a biological attack with smallpox.

Chandini Raina MacIntyre, Valentina Costantino, Mohana Priya Kunasekaran

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Chandini Raina MacIntyreBiosecurity Program, Kirby Institute, Faculty of Medicine, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
Valentina CostantinoBiosecurity Program, Kirby Institute, Faculty of Medicine, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.
Mohana Priya KunasekaranBiosecurity Program, Kirby Institute, Faculty of Medicine, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia.ORCID 0000-0001-5779-7979

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Planning for a re-emergent epidemic of smallpox requires surge capacity of space, resources and personnel within health systems. There are many uncertainties in such a scenario, including likelihood and size of an attack, speed of response and health system capacity. We used a model for smallpox transmission to determine requirements for hospital beds, contact tracing and health workers (HCWs) in Sydney, Australia, during a modelled epidemic of smallpox. Sensitivity analysis was done on attack size, speed of response and proportion of case isolation and contact tracing. We estimated 100638 clinical HCWs and 14595 public hospital beds in Sydney. Rapid response, case isolation and contact tracing are influential on epidemic size, with case isolation more influential than contact tracing. With 95% of cases isolated, outbreak control can be achieved within 100 days even with only 50% of contacts traced. However, if case isolation and contact tracing both fall to 50%, epidemic control is lost. With a smaller initial attack and a response commencing 20 days after the attack, health system impacts are modest. The requirement for hospital beds will vary from up to 4% to 100% of all available beds in best and worst case scenarios. If the response is delayed, or if the attack infects 10000 people, all available beds will be exceeded within 40 days, with corresponding surge requirements for clinical health care workers (HCWs). We estimated there are 330 public health workers in Sydney with up to 940,350 contacts to be traced. At least 3 million respirators will be needed for the first 100 days. To ensure adequate health system capacity, rapid response, high rates of case isolation, excellent contact tracing and vaccination, and protection of HCWs should be a priority. Surge capacity must be planned. Failures in any of these could cause health system failure, with inadequate beds, quarantine spaces, personnel, PPE and inability to manage other acute health conditions.

Indexed as

BioterrorismDelivery of Health CareDisease OutbreaksHospitalsModels, BiologicalVariola virusAustraliaFemaleHumansMaleSmallpox

Identifiers

PMID31199825
PMCPMC6568391

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.