Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31130738›Full record

ArticleEconometrica : journal of the Econometric Society2018

Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals.

Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, Neale Mahoney

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 19 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
19citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

19 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Trial
  2. Trial
  3. Does more generous health insurance reimbursement lead to moral hazard? Evidence from large-scale administrative data in China.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2026
    Article
  4. Review
  5. Article
  6. Length of hospital stays and financial incentives: evidence from Dutch rehabilitation centers.The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2024
    Article
  7. MONITORING FOR WASTE: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE AUDITS.The quarterly journal of economics · 2024
    Article
  8. Physician responses to Medicare reimbursement rates.Journal of health economics · 2023
    Article
  9. Provider responses to discontinuous tariffs: evidence from Dutch rehabilitation care.International journal of health economics and management · 2022
    Article
  10. VOLUNTARY REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM MEDICARE PAYMENT REFORM.The quarterly journal of economics · 2022
    Article
  11. Article
  12. Availability of Palliative Care in Long-Term Acute Care Hospitals.Journal of the American Medical Directors Association · 2021
    Article
  13. Do discontinuities in marginal reimbursement affect inpatient psychiatric care in Germany?The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2021
    Article
  14. Article
  15. Randomized trial shows healthcare payment reform has equal-sized spillover effects on patients not targeted by reform.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2020
    Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Provider Incentives and Healthcare Costs: Evidence from Long-Term Care Hospitals.Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society · 2018
    Article
  19. Moral Hazard in Health Insurance: What We Know and How We Know It.Journal of the European Economic Association · 2018
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Liran EinavDepartment of Economics, Stanford University, and NBER, leinav@stanford.edu.
Amy FinkelsteinDepartment of Economics, MIT, and NBER, afink@mit.edu.
Neale MahoneyBooth School of Business, University of Chicago, and NBER, Neale.Mahoney@chicagobooth.edu.

Funding

Determinants of Elderly Health: The Role of Place-Based FactorsR37AG032449 · NIA · MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY · PI FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 2020 to 2025
$5.9M
The Design of Social Insurance for the Elderly: Public Pensions & Health InsurancR01AG032449 · NIA · NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH · PI EINAV, LIRAN, FINKELSTEIN, AMY N. · 2009 to 2019
$5.6M
NIA NIH HHS R01 AG032449NIA NIH HHS R37 AG032449
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

We study the design of provider incentives in the post-acute care setting - a high-stakes but under-studied segment of the healthcare system. We focus on long-term care hospitals (LTCHs) and the large (approximately $13,500) jump in Medicare payments they receive when a patient s stay reaches a threshold number of days. Discharges increase substantially after the threshold, with the marginal discharged patient in relatively better health. Despite the large financial incentives and behavioral response in a high mortality population, we are unable to detect any compelling evidence of an impact on patient mortality. To assess provider behavior under counterfactual payment schedules, we estimate a simple dynamic discrete choice model of LTCH discharge decisions. When we conservatively limit ourselves to alternative contracts that hold the LTCH harmless, we find that an alternative contract can generate Medicare savings of about $2,100 per admission, or about 5% of total payments. More aggressive payment reforms can generate substantially greater savings, but the accompanying reduction in LTCH profits has potential out-of-sample consequences. Our results highlight how improved financial incentives may be able to reduce healthcare spending, without negative consequences for industry profits or patient health.

Indexed as

financial incentivesHealthcarenonlinear contractspost-acute care

Identifiers

PMID31130738
PMCPMC6529222

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.