Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31099058›Full record

ArticleThe Milbank quarterly2019

Normalizing Tobacco? The Politics of Trade, Investment, and Tobacco Control.

Holly Jarman

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in The Milbank quarterly, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Review
  3. Article
  4. Overcoming tobacco industry opposition to standardized packaging in the Americas.Revista panamericana de salud publica = Pan American journal of public health · 2022
    Article
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Holly JarmanUniversity of Michigan School of Public Health.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Policy Points Tobacco industry denormalization is a key strategy for tobacco control that has been formalized in the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. International trade and investment laws are a potential threat to tobacco industry denormalization because they do not automatically incorporate denormalization and, in theory, treat tobacco firms like other commercial interests. Countries that seek to defend tobacco control policies against international trade and investment challenges need to have good governance in two senses: good governance as understood by tribunals and good-enough governance to manage the processes and requirements that enable policies to survive international challenges. CONTEXT: Tobacco industry denormalization (TID), portraying tobacco product manufacturers as a deadly industry, is a major strategy for public health advocates. Using this strategy, activists around the world have successfully pushed for governments to enact tobacco control regulations, including the unprecedented international Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). TID has been a distinctive legal and political strategy that has affected the place of tobacco in law and has both inspired and constrained those who would imitate the strategy in other areas of regulation, such as diet or alcohol. It is therefore a case study in the creation of a distinctive legal approach and of threats to that approach from the changing role of world trade and investment law, which creates a new set of venues that tobacco industry advocates can use to redefine tobacco as a normal good and to seek out "fair and equitable treatment" for their industry.

methodsI review legal and policy documents pertaining to two major challenges to tobacco control policies in Australia and Uruguay aimed at controlling industry branding.

findingsInternational trade and investment law challenges TID and raises fundamental questions about the role of the state in protecting public health. Recent trade disputes involving Uruguay and Australia illustrate this dynamic. Despite losing high-court challenges against packaging regulations in both countries, tobacco firms were still able to challenge states in a different way, through international trade and investment agreements. This article identifies the industry's strategies and the responses of those seeking to avoid renormalizing tobacco as a part of world trade. In particular, states must demonstrate that their tobacco control policies satisfy standards set by tribunals, which include standards of good governance, and they must prepare their policies in a way that reduces legal risk and requires good governance.

conclusionsAlthough TID has strengthened the hand of tobacco control advocates, TID strategies alone are not sufficient to defend public regulations against extraterritorial legal challenges in an arena that resists the basic TID technique of singling out a particular industry. Public health advocates might also note the FCTC's aid in helping governments defend themselves against these challenges and consider similar international instruments for other areas.

Indexed as

InternationalityCommerceGovernment RegulationHumansPublic HealthTobacco Industrygovernanceinvestmenttobacco controltrade

Identifiers

PMID31099058
PMCPMC6554500

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.