ArticleFrontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology2019
Next Steps for Access to Safe, Secure DNA Synthesis.
Article in Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 34 papers.
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Who cites it
34 citing papers in PubMed.
- A system capable of verifiably and privately screening global DNA synthesis.National science review · 2026Article
- Assembling unregulated DNA segments bypasses synthesis screening: regulate fragments as select agents.Nature communications · 2026Article
- Developing a standard definition for sequences of concern.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
- Toward relational biosecurity: understanding AI-enabled biology as a connected system.Frontiers in microbiology · 2026Article
- Red-teaming as an imperative for strengthening synthetic nucleic acid screening.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Review
- Strengthening global biosecurity for synthetic nucleic acid technology: from sequence screening to risk-based governance in the AI era.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Review
- Automated Laboratory Security Tiers: a framework for evaluating and mitigating biosecurity risks from latent capabilities.Frontiers in microbiology · 2026Article
- Rethinking governance of synthetic cells.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
- Compounding asymmetries in nucleic acid synthesis screening: policy pathways for strengthening global biosecurity governance.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026Article
- The convergence of AI and synthetic biology: the looming deluge.npj biomedical innovations · 2025Article
- Emerging technologies transforming the future of global biosecurity.Frontiers in digital health · 2025Review
- The need for adaptability in detection, characterization, and attribution of biosecurity threats.Nature communications · 2024Review
- Five Things Not to Do When Discovering a Biosecurity Vulnerability.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2024Article
- Practical Questions for Securing Nucleic Acid Synthesis.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2024Article
- A Sensitivity Study for Interpreting Nucleic Acid Sequence Screening Regulatory and Guidance Documentation: Toward a Foundational Synthetic Nucleic Acid Sequence Screening Framework.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2024Article
- Developing a Common Global Baseline for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2024Article
- Limiting open science? Three approaches to bottom-up governance of dual-use research of concern.Pathogens and global health · 2024Review
- Grand challenge in biosafety and biosecurity.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2024Article
- Exploring the dimensions of responsible research systems and cultures: a scoping review.Royal Society open science · 2024Article
- Studying pathogens degrades BLAST-based pathogen identification.Scientific reports · 2023Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
The DNA synthesis industry has, since the invention of gene-length synthesis, worked proactively to ensure synthesis is carried out securely and safely. Informed by guidance from the U.S. government, several of these companies have collaborated over the last decade to produce a set of best practices for customer and sequence screening prior to manufacture. Taken together, these practices ensure that synthetic DNA is used to advance research that is designed and intended for public benefit. With increasing scale in the industry and expanding capability in the synthetic biology toolset, it is worth revisiting current practices to evaluate additional measures to ensure the continued safety and wide availability of DNA synthesis. Here we encourage specific steps, in part derived from successes in the cybersecurity community, that can ensure synthesis screening systems stay well ahead of emerging challenges, to continue to enable responsible research advances. Gene synthesis companies, science and technology funders, policymakers, and the scientific community as a whole have a shared duty to continue to minimize risk and maximize the safety and security of DNA synthesis to further power world-changing developments in advanced biological manufacturing, agriculture, drug development, healthcare, and energy.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.