Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31041590›Full record

Observational studyJournal of general internal medicine2019

Real-time Feedback in Pay-for-Performance: Does More Information Lead to Improvement?

Amelia M Bond, Kevin G Volpp, Ezekiel J Emanuel, Kristen Caldarella, Amanda Hodlofski, Lee Sacks, Pankaj Patel, Kara Sokol, Salvatore Vittore, Don Calgano and 4 more

Abstract readObservational Study
In one paragraph

Observational study in Journal of general internal medicine, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 5 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Trial
  4. Trial
  5. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

14 authors.

Amelia M BondHealth Care Management, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA. amb2036@med.cornell.edu.
Kevin G VolppLeonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
Ezekiel J EmanuelLeonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
Kristen CaldarellaDivision of Health Policy, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
Amanda HodlofskiHealthCore, Inc., Wilmington, DE, USA.
Lee SacksAdvocate Health System, Chicago, IL, USA.
Pankaj PatelAdvocate Health System, Chicago, IL, USA.
Kara SokolAdvocate Health System, Chicago, IL, USA.
Salvatore VittoreAdvocate Health System, Chicago, IL, USA.
Don CalganoAdvocate Health System, Chicago, IL, USA.
Carrie NelsonAdvocate Health System, Chicago, IL, USA.
Kevin WengAdvocate Health System, Chicago, IL, USA.
Andrea TroxelDepartment of Population Health, New York University School of Medicine, New York, NY, USA.
Amol NavatheLeonard Davis Institute of Health Economics, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundPay-for-performance (P4P) has been used expansively to improve quality of care delivered by physicians. However, to what extent P4P works through the provision of information versus financial incentives is poorly understood.

objectiveTo determine whether an increase in information feedback without changes to financial incentives resulted in improved physician performance within an existing P4P program. INTERVENTION/EXPOSURE: Implementation of a new registry enabling real-time feedback to physicians on quality measure performance.

designObservational, predictive piecewise model at the physician-measure level to examine whether registry introduction associated with performance changes. We used detailed physician quality measure data 3 years prior to registry implementation (2010-2012) and 2 years after implementation (2014-2015). We also linked physician-level data including age, gender, and board certification; group-level data including registry click rates; and patient panel data including chronic conditions.

participantsFour hundred thirty-four physicians continuously affiliated with Advocate from 2010 to 2015. MAIN MEASURES: Physician performance on ten quality metrics. KEY

resultsWe found no consistent pattern of improvement associated with the availability of real-time information across ten measures. Relative to predicted performance without the registry, average performance increased for two measures (childhood immunization status-rotavirus (p < 0.001) and diabetes care-medical attention for nephropathy (p = 0.024)) and decreased for three measures (childhood immunization status-influenza (p < 0.001) and diabetes care-HbA1c testing (p < 0.001) and poor HbA1c control (p < 0.001)). Results were consistent for subgroup analysis on those most able to improve, i.e., physicians in the bottom tertile of performance prior to registry introduction. Physicians who improved most were in groups that accessed the registry more than those who improved least (8.0 vs 10.0 times per week, p = 0.010).

conclusionsMore frequent provision of information, provided in real-time, was insufficient to improve physician performance in an existing P4P program with high baseline performance. Results suggest that electronic registries may not themselves drive performance improvement. Future work should consider testing information feedback enhancements with financial incentives.

Indexed as

FeedbackAdultAgedDelivery of Health CareFemaleHumansMaleMiddle AgedPhysiciansReimbursement, Incentiveevaluationhealth information technologyperformance measurementphysician behavior

Identifiers

PMID31041590
PMCPMC6712150

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.