Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31013741›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2019

Enhancing Sensor Network Security with Improved Internal Hardware Design.

Weizheng Wang, Zhuo Deng, Jin Wang

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Weizheng WangSchool of Computer & Communication Engineering, Changsha University of Science & Technology, Changsha 410114, China. peakexpe@csust.edu.cn.ORCID 0000-0001-7031-365X
Zhuo DengSchool of Computer & Communication Engineering, Changsha University of Science & Technology, Changsha 410114, China. dz5019@stu.csust.edu.cn.
Jin WangSchool of Computer & Communication Engineering, Changsha University of Science & Technology, Changsha 410114, China. jinwang@csust.edu.cn.ORCID 0000-0001-5473-8738

Funding

the National Natural Science Foundation of China 61303042 and 61702052
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

With the rapid development of the Internet-of-Things (IoT), sensors are being widely applied in industry and human life. Sensor networks based on IoT have strong Information transmission and processing capabilities. The security of sensor networks is progressively crucial. Cryptographic algorithms are widely used in sensor networks to guarantee security. Hardware implementations are preferred, since software implementations offer lower throughout and require more computational resources. Cryptographic chips should be tested in a manufacturing process and in the field to ensure their quality. As a widely used design-for-testability (DFT) technique, scan design can enhance the testability of the chips by improving the controllability and observability of the internal flip-flops. However, it may become a backdoor to leaking sensitive information related to the cipher key, and thus, threaten the security of a cryptographic chip. In this paper, a secure scan test architecture was proposed to resist scan-based noninvasive attacks on cryptographic chips with boundary scan design. Firstly, the proposed DFT architecture provides the scan chain reset mechanism by gating a mode-switching detection signal into reset input of scan cells. The contents of scan chains will be erased when the working mode is switched between test mode and functional mode, and thus, it can deter mode-switching based noninvasive attacks. Secondly, loading the secret key into scan chains of cryptographic chips is prohibited in the test mode. As a result, the test-mode-only scan attack can also be thwarted. On the other hand, shift operation under functional mode is disabled to overcome scan attack in the functional mode. The proposed secure scheme ensures the security of cryptographic chips for sensor networks with extremely low area penalty.

Indexed as

cryptographic chipsinformation securityInternet-of-Thingssensor networkssensors

Identifiers

PMID31013741
PMCPMC6515428

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.