Evidence map›Paper›PMID 31000712›Full record

ArticleNature communications2019

Bayesian nonparametric models characterize instantaneous strategies in a competitive dynamic game.

Kelsey R McDonald, William F Broderick, Scott A Huettel, John M Pearson

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Nature communications, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed
7.4field-weighted citation impact, top 3% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed, 25 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Minimal impact of consolidation on learned switch-readiness.Journal of experimental psychology. Learning, memory, and cognition · 2021
    Article
  6. Continuous decisions.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2021
    Article
  7. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.

Kelsey R McDonaldDuke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University, Durham, 27710, NC, USA.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7484-5300
William F BroderickCenter for Neural Science, New York University, New York, 10003, NY, USA.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8999-9003
Scott A HuettelDuke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University, Durham, 27710, NC, USA.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5092-4936
John M PearsonDuke Institute for Brain Sciences, Duke University, Durham, 27710, NC, USA. john.pearson@duke.edu.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9876-7837
Duke University · USNew York University · USPearson (United States) · US

Funding

Mechanisms Regulating Complex Social BehaviorR01MH108627 · NIMH · UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA · PI HUETTEL, SCOTT ALLEN, PLATT, MICHAEL L · 2016 to 2025
$7.1M
Neural Circuit Mechanisms Mediating TMS and Oxytocin Effects on Social CognitionR37MH109728 · NIMH · UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA · PI PLATT, MICHAEL L · 2016 to 2025
$6.7M
Nonparametric Bayes Methods for Big Data in NeuroscienceK01ES025442 · NIEHS · DUKE UNIVERSITY · PI PEARSON, JOHN · 2014 to 2018
$732k
A Compute Cluster for Brain Imaging and AnalysisS10OD021480 · OD · DUKE UNIVERSITY · PI SONG, ALLEN W · 2016 to 2016
$568k
NIEHS NIH HHS K01 ES025442NIH HHS S10 OD021480NIMH NIH HHS R01-108627
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Previous studies of strategic social interaction in game theory have predominantly used games with clearly-defined turns and limited choices. Yet, most real-world social behaviors involve dynamic, coevolving decisions by interacting agents, which poses challenges for creating tractable models of behavior. Here, using a game in which humans competed against both real and artificial opponents, we show that it is possible to quantify the instantaneous dynamic coupling between agents. Adopting a reinforcement learning approach, we use Gaussian Processes to model the policy and value functions of participants as a function of both game state and opponent identity. We found that higher-scoring participants timed their final change in direction to moments when the opponent's counter-strategy was weaker, while lower-scoring participants less precisely timed their final moves. This approach offers a natural set of metrics for facilitating analysis at multiple timescales and suggests new classes of experimental paradigms for assessing behavior.

Indexed as

Choice BehaviorGame TheoryModels, PsychologicalSocial BehaviorAdultBayes TheoremBehavior Observation TechniquesFemaleHealthy VolunteersHumansMaleMiddle AgedNormal DistributionReinforcement, PsychologyYoung Adult

Identifiers

PMID31000712
PMCPMC6472387
OpenAlexW2951755790

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.