Gossip in the Dictator and Ultimatum Games: Its Immediate and Downstream Consequences for Cooperation.

Junhui Wu, Daniel Balliet, Yu Kou, Paul A M Van Lange

Abstract read

In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in psychology, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it

0cells of the map it votes in

2citing papers in PubMed

–field-weighted citation impact

1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

Gossip promotes cooperation only when it is pro-socially motivated.Scientific reports · 2022
Article
Four Puzzles of Reputation-Based Cooperation : Content, Process, Honesty, and Structure.Human nature (Hawthorne, N.Y.) · 2022
Article

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Junhui WuBeijing Key Laboratory of Applied Experimental Psychology, National Demonstration Center for Experimental Psychology Education, Institute of Developmental Psychology, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China.

Daniel BallietDepartment of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Yu KouBeijing Key Laboratory of Applied Experimental Psychology, National Demonstration Center for Experimental Psychology Education, Institute of Developmental Psychology, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China.

Paul A M Van LangeDepartment of Experimental and Applied Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In this research, we examine how cooperation emerges and develops in sequential dyadic interactions when the initial interaction varies in strategic considerations (i.e., fear of partner rejection) or potential gossip by one's partner that may affect subsequent interactions. In a lab experiment involving real-time interactions (

Indexed as

cooperationdictator gamegossipreciprocitytrustultimatum game

Identifiers

PMID30984073

DOI10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00651

PMCPMC6447715

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata

LicenceCC BY

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.