Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30966921›Full record

ArticlePhilosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences2019

Uncertainty and computational complexity.

Peter Bossaerts, Nitin Yadav, Carsten Murawski

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 14 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
14citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

14 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Resource-rational psychopathology.Behavioral neuroscience · 2024
    Review
  7. Article
  8. Review
  9. Theory Before the Test: How to Build High-Verisimilitude Explanatory Theories in Psychological Science.Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science · 2021
    Article
  10. Article
  11. Rational inattention and tonic dopamine.PLoS computational biology · 2021
    Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2019
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Peter Bossaerts1 Brain, Mind and Markets Laboratory, Department of Finance, The University of Melbourne , Parkville, Victoria 3010 , Australia.
Nitin Yadav1 Brain, Mind and Markets Laboratory, Department of Finance, The University of Melbourne , Parkville, Victoria 3010 , Australia.
Carsten Murawski1 Brain, Mind and Markets Laboratory, Department of Finance, The University of Melbourne , Parkville, Victoria 3010 , Australia.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Modern theories of decision-making typically model uncertainty about decision options using the tools of probability theory. This is exemplified by the Savage framework, the most popular framework in decision-making research. There, decision-makers are assumed to choose from among available decision options as if they maximized subjective expected utility, which is given by the utilities of outcomes in different states weighted with subjective beliefs about the occurrence of those states. Beliefs are captured by probabilities and new information is incorporated using Bayes' Law. The primary concern of the Savage framework is to ensure that decision-makers' choices are rational. Here, we use concepts from computational complexity theory to expose two major weaknesses of the framework. Firstly, we argue that in most situations, subjective utility maximization is computationally intractable, which means that the Savage axioms are implausible. We discuss empirical evidence supporting this claim. Secondly, we argue that there exist many decision situations in which the nature of uncertainty is such that (random) sampling in combination with Bayes' Law is an ineffective strategy to reduce uncertainty. We discuss several implications of these weaknesses from both an empirical and a normative perspective. This article is part of the theme issue 'Risk taking and impulsive behaviour: fundamental discoveries, theoretical perspectives and clinical implications'.

Indexed as

Decision MakingProbabilityUncertaintyBayes TheoremHumansBayesiancomputational complexityexpected utilityuncertainty

Identifiers

PMID30966921
PMCPMC6335453

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.