Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30956726›Full record

ArticleNeuroethics2019

Procedural Moral Enhancement.

G Owen Schaefer, Julian Savulescu

Registry-linked trialAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Neuroethics, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. It is linked to trial NCT06735989 (Effects of a Moral Reasoning Intervention on Moral Justification Abilities), which is not on this map. Cited by 5 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
5citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

NCT06735989 nacompletednot on this mapstarted 2022, after this paper: background citation

Effects of a Moral Reasoning Intervention on Moral Justification Abilities

TypeinterventionalSponsorIRCCS San RaffaeleRan2022 to 2025Enrolled86ConditionsMoral Development, Moral Dilemma, Healthy Controls, Moral JustificationArmsLecture on moral reasoning, Lecture on logical reasoning
3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

5 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Human Enhancement: A Conceptual Scoping Review.The Journal of medicine and philosophy · 2026
    Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Better Minds, Better Morals: A Procedural Guide to Better Judgment.Journal of posthuman studies : philosophy, technology, media · 2017
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

G Owen Schaefer1Centre for Biomedical Ethics, Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Block MD11, Clinical Research Centre, 10 Medical Drive, Singapore, 117597 Singapore.
Julian Savulescu2Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, Suite 8, Littlegate House, 16/17 St Ebbe's St, Oxford, OX1 1PT UK.

Funding

Wellcome Trust
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

While philosophers are often concerned with the conditions for moral knowledge or justification, in practice something arguably less demanding is just as, if not more, important - reliably making correct moral judgments. Judges and juries should hand down fair sentences, government officials should decide on just laws, members of ethics committees should make sound recommendations, and so on. We want such agents, more often than not and as often as possible, to make the right decisions. The purpose of this paper is to propose a method of enhancing the moral reliability of such agents. In particular, we advocate for a procedural approach; certain internal processes generally contribute to people's moral reliability. Building on the early work of Rawls, we identify several particular factors related to moral reasoning that are specific enough to be the target of practical intervention: logical competence, conceptual understanding, empirical competence, openness, empathy and bias. Improving on these processes can in turn make people more morally reliable in a variety of contexts and has implications for recent debates over moral enhancement.

Indexed as

Moral enhancementProceduralismRawlsReliability

Identifiers

PMID30956726
PMCPMC6411668

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.