Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30945321›Full record

ArticleBioethics2019

The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply.

Bruce P Blackshaw

Abstract readComment
PubMed Publisher
In one paragraph

Article in Bioethics, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Impairment Arguments, Interests, and Circularity.The Journal of medicine and philosophy · 2024
    Article
  2. A reply to Gillham on the impairment principle.Medicine, health care, and philosophy · 2024
    Article
  3. Three Problems with the Impairment Argument.Asian bioethics review · 2023
    Article
  4. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Bruce P BlackshawDepartment of Philosophy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-9115-582X

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro-choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral.

Indexed as

Abortion, InducedAbortion, SpontaneousFemaleFetusHumansPersonhoodPregnancyValue of Lifeabortionfetal alcohol syndromeimpairment argumentpersonhood

Identifiers

PMID30945321

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.