Working memory loads differentially influence frame-induced bias and normative choice in risky decision making.

Risky decision making can be biased by several types of contextual factors-in particular, framing of outcomes. A popular explanation for outcome framing effects is based on presumed affective reactions that contribute to accepting sure gains and avoiding sure losses. Other theories propose that selective weighting of information about gains and losses contributes to framing bias. Prior research on framing bias has focused on preferences rather than on decisions in which choices can be classified as advantageous (correct) or disadvantageous (incorrect) by a normative criterion. The current study used a novel hypothetical risky decision making task offering choices between a sure option and a gamble option. The gamble was advantageous or disadvantageous on different trials based on the normative criterion of expected value. Results showed risk avoidance with a gain frame and risk seeking with a loss frame, comparable to findings when choices involve preferences. We also examined the impact of working memory loads of either non-affective stimuli, most likely to interfere with acquisition of choice information, or affective stimuli, which might influence affective processes contributing to framing. The results were that non-affective working memory load produced the greatest framing magnitude, while affective load produced changes in framing magnitude across trials that varied by valence. In addition, only the non-affective load decreased advantageous choices and reduced the accuracy of answers to knowledge probe questions about the choices. The findings are consistent with the notion that framing effects may arise from cognitive non-engagement with the task, rather than arising by way of affective processes. Affective loads had a limited influence on framing and no reliable impact on choice accuracy or choice knowledge, suggesting that the affective loads influenced the weighting of choice information.