Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30915169›Full record

ArticleEurope's journal of psychology2019

Irrational Beliefs.

Iris Žeželj, Ljiljana B Lazarević

Abstract readEditorial
In one paragraph

Article in Europe's journal of psychology, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Iris ŽeželjDepartment of Psychology, Laboratory for Social Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia.
Ljiljana B LazarevićInstitute of Psychology and Laboratory for the Study of Individual Differences, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Irrational beliefs are often used as an umbrella term that comprises a variety of psychological constructs: from specific cognitive biases to a wider class of epistemologically suspect beliefs (superstitions, paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs, conspiracy theories etc.) or cognitive styles (analytical versus intuitive thinking), but also unsubstantiated self-related beliefs. This collection of papers illustrates this diversity well. Apart from the descriptive portion of the data, which has merit on its own, the authors provide important methodological innovations in the way these beliefs are measured, but also look deeper in their functionality and consequences.

Indexed as

cognitive biasesconspiracy theoriesepistemologically suspect beliefsintuitive thinkingirrational beliefsparanormal beliefs

Identifiers

PMID30915169
PMCPMC6396700

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.