Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30862280›Full record

ArticleJournal of the Royal Society, Interface2019

Evolution of cooperation on large networks with community structure.

Babak Fotouhi, Naghmeh Momeni, Benjamin Allen, Martin A Nowak

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Journal of the Royal Society, Interface, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 21 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
21citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

21 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Strategy evolution on temporal hypergraphs.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. Promoting collective cooperation through temporal interactions.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  4. Evolution of trust in theJournal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2025
    Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Evolution of cooperation with asymmetric social interactions.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2022
    Article
  10. Article
  11. Bilateral costly expulsions resolve the public goods dilemma.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2021
    Article
  12. Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
  15. Interplay betweenScientific reports · 2020
    Article
  16. Article
  17. A novel route to cyclic dominance in voluntary social dilemmas.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2020
    Article
  18. Article
  19. Evolutionary games on isothermal graphs.Nature communications · 2019
    Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Babak Fotouhi1 Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University , Cambridge, MA , USA.
Naghmeh Momeni1 Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University , Cambridge, MA , USA.
Benjamin Allen1 Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University , Cambridge, MA , USA.
Martin A Nowak1 Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University , Cambridge, MA , USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Cooperation is a major factor in the evolution of human societies. The structure of social networks, which affects the dynamics of cooperation and other interpersonal phenomena, have common structural signatures. One of these signatures is the tendency to organize as groups. This tendency gives rise to networks with community structure, which are composed of distinct modules. In this paper, we study analytically the evolutionary game dynamics on large modular networks in the limit of weak selection. We obtain novel analytical conditions such that natural selection favours cooperation over defection. We calculate the transition point for each community to favour cooperation. We find that a critical inter-community link creation probability exists for given group density, such that the overall network supports cooperation even if individual communities inhibit it. As a byproduct, we present solutions for the critical benefit-to-cost ratio which perform with remarkable accuracy for diverse generative network models, including those with community structure and heavy-tailed degree distributions. We also demonstrate the generalizability of the results to arbitrary two-player games.

Indexed as

Cooperative BehaviorInterpersonal RelationsModels, BiologicalSelection, GeneticSocial NetworkingHumanscommunity structurecooperationevolutionary game theorynetworks

Identifiers

PMID30862280
PMCPMC6451403

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.