Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30858309›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2019

Incentivizing hospital infection control.

Sarah E Drohan, Simon A Levin, Bryan T Grenfell, Ramanan Laxminarayan

Open access · bronzeAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 15 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
15citing papers in PubMed
3.0field-weighted citation impact, top 10% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

15 citing papers in PubMed, 38 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Review
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
  12. Article
  13. Review
  14. Article
  15. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors at 3 institutions in 1 country.

Sarah E DrohanProgram in Applied and Computational Mathematics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; sedrohan@princeton.edu slevin@princeton.edu ramanan@cddep.org.ORCID 0000-0001-9789-2815
Simon A LevinProgram in Applied and Computational Mathematics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; sedrohan@princeton.edu slevin@princeton.edu ramanan@cddep.org.
Bryan T GrenfellDepartment of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544.
Ramanan LaxminarayanPrinceton Environmental Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544; sedrohan@princeton.edu slevin@princeton.edu ramanan@cddep.org.ORCID 0000-0002-1390-9016
Princeton University · USCenter for Disease Dynamics, Economics & Policy · USNational Institutes of Health · US

Funding

Scientific and Technical Computing CoreP2CHD047879 · NICHD · PRINCETON UNIVERSITY · PI SALGANIK, MATTHEW J. · 2014 to 2018
$2.0M
NICHD NIH HHS P2C HD047879
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) pose a significant burden to patient safety. Institutions can implement hospital infection control (HIC) measures to reduce the impact of HAIs. Since patients can carry pathogens between institutions, there is an economic incentive for hospitals to free ride on the HIC investments of other facilities. Subsidies for infection control by public health authorities could encourage regional spending on HIC. We develop coupled mathematical models of epidemiology and hospital behavior in a game-theoretic framework to investigate how hospitals may change spending behavior in response to subsidies. We demonstrate that under a limited budget, a dollar-for-dollar matching grant outperforms both a fixed-amount subsidy and a subsidy on uninfected patients in reducing the number of HAIs in a single institution. Additionally, when multiple hospitals serve a community, funding priority should go to the hospital with a lower transmission rate. Overall, subsidies incentivize HIC spending and reduce the overall prevalence of HAIs.

Indexed as

Game TheoryHospitalsInfection ControlModels, TheoreticalBudgetsCross InfectionDrug Resistance, MicrobialEconomics, HospitalHospital CostsHumansPrevalenceantimicrobial resistancegame theorynosocomial infectionsubsidy

Identifiers

PMID30858309
PMCPMC6442548
OpenAlexW2921084292

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.