Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30729189›Full record

ArticleCommunications biology2019

Neighborhood size-effects shape growing population dynamics in evolutionary public goods games.

Gregory J Kimmel, Philip Gerlee, Joel S Brown, Philipp M Altrock

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Communications biology, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 11 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Gregory J Kimmel1Department of Integrated Mathematical Oncology, H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute, Tampa, FL 33629 USA.
Philip Gerlee2Department of Mathematical Sciences, Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, SE-412 96 Sweden.
Joel S Brown1Department of Integrated Mathematical Oncology, H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute, Tampa, FL 33629 USA.
Philipp M Altrock1Department of Integrated Mathematical Oncology, H. Lee Moffitt Cancer Center and Research Institute, Tampa, FL 33629 USA.ORCID 0000-0001-7731-3345

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

An evolutionary game emerges when a subset of individuals incur costs to provide benefits to all individuals. Public goods games (PGG) cover the essence of such dilemmas in which cooperators are prone to exploitation by defectors. We model the population dynamics of a non-linear PGG and consider density-dependence on the global level, while the game occurs within local neighborhoods. At low cooperation, increases in the public good provide increasing returns. At high cooperation, increases provide diminishing returns. This mechanism leads to diverse evolutionarily stable strategies, including monomorphic and polymorphic populations, and neighborhood-size-driven state changes, resulting in hysteresis between equilibria. Stochastic or strategy-dependent variations in neighborhood sizes favor coexistence by destabilizing monomorphic states. We integrate our model with experiments of cancer cell growth and confirm that our framework describes PGG dynamics observed in cellular populations. Our findings advance the understanding of how neighborhood-size effects in PGG shape the dynamics of growing populations.

Indexed as

Games, RecreationalGame TheoryModels, StatisticalPopulation DynamicsCooperative BehaviorHumansResidence CharacteristicsSocial ProblemsStochastic Processes

Identifiers

PMID30729189
PMCPMC6363775

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.