Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30693564›Full record

ArticleThe Milbank quarterly2019

Public Meets Private: Conversations Between Coca-Cola and the CDC.

Nason Maani Hessari, Gary Ruskin, Martin McKEE, David Stuckler

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in The Milbank quarterly, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 39 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
39citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

39 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Commercial Determinants of Latinx Health: A Scoping Review of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages in the USA.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2026
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  13. Interactions Between Nutrition Professionals and Industry: A Scoping Review.International journal of health policy and management · 2023
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Nason Maani HessariLondon School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Gary RuskinU.S. Right to Know.
Martin McKEELondon School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
David StucklerDondena Research Center, Bocconi University.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Policy Points There is growing understanding of how manufacturers of harmful products influence health policy. The strategies, approaches, and influences from such manufacturers that are detrimental to health have been termed the "corporate" or "commercial" determinants of health. However, while partnerships with the tobacco industry are clearly unacceptable for public health organizations, ties to other industries continue to be pursued. Such partnerships may influence health organizations in a number of ways detrimental to population health. However, with the exception of tobacco industry tactics as revealed by internal documents, we know relatively little about how this influence operates. This article uses emails between the Coca-Cola Company and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which we obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests, to explore the nature of corporate influence, conflicts of interest, and lobbying "in their own words," and highlights the need for greater transparency and clearer policies on engaging with such industries. CONTEXT: There is a continuing debate about the appropriateness of contacts between manufacturers of some harmful products and health researchers, as well as practitioners and policymakers. Some argue that such contacts may be a means of exerting undue influence, while others present them as an opportunity to pursue shared health goals. This article examines interactions between the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Coca-Cola Company (Coca-Cola) as revealed by communications obtained through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.

methodsWe sent 10 US FOIA requests in 2016/2017 for communications between employees at the CDC and Coca-Cola. We then performed a thematic content analysis of the documents provided.

findingsOf our 10 FOIA requests, 3 requests are still pending (at the time of this publication); 5 were rejected as too broad or because no records were found; and 3 returned 295 pages from 86 emails. The CDC withheld 102 pages to "protect commercial or financial information which is privileged or confidential." The returned emails demonstrate three main themes in Coca-Cola's contact with CDC employees: to gain and expand access, to lobby, and to shift attention and blame away from sugar-sweetened beverages.

conclusionsThe emails we obtained using FOIA requests reveal efforts by Coca-Cola to lobby the CDC to advance corporate objectives rather than health, including to influence the World Health Organization. Our findings provide a rare example of the ways in which corporate interests attempt to influence public health practitioners "in their own words," and they demonstrate a need for clearer policies on avoiding partnerships with manufacturers of harmful products.

Indexed as

Carbonated BeveragesCenters for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S.Conflict of InterestFood IndustryLobbyingDietary SugarsElectronic MailPublic-Private Sector PartnershipsTaxesUnited StatesDietary SugarsCenters for Disease Control and Preventioncommercial determinants of healthgovernment transparencypublic health

Identifiers

PMID30693564
PMCPMC6422605

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.