Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30659106›Full record

ArticleTobacco control2019

Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies.

Eric Crosbie, Stella Bialous, Stanton A Glantz

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Tobacco control, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
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  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Tobacco supply and demand strategies used in African countries.Bulletin of the World Health Organization · 2021
    Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Eric CrosbieSchool of Community Health Sciences, University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada, USA.
Stella BialousCenter for Tobacco Control Research and Educatio, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, California, USA.
Stanton A GlantzCenter for Tobacco Control Research and Educatio, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, California, USA.ORCID 0000-0003-4620-6672

Funding

ANALYSIS OF TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTSR01CA087472 · NCI · UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO · PI LING, PAMELA MAY · 2000 to 2018
$12.5M
Postdoctoral training in tobacco controlT32CA113710 · NCI · UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO · PI LING, PAMELA MAY · 2016 to 2020
$2.6M
NCI NIH HHS R01 CA087472NCI NIH HHS T32 CA113710
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveAnalyse the transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol).

methodsReview of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods.

resultsFacing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments' law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs' claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade.

conclusionGovernments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.

Indexed as

CommerceCrimeHumansInternational CooperationLaw EnforcementPublic PolicyTobacco IndustryTobacco ProductsGlobalisationIllegal Tobacco ProductsPublic PolicyTobacco IndustryTobacco Industry Documents

Identifiers

PMID30659106
PMCPMC6639151

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceTDM
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.