ArticleTobacco control2019
Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies.
Article in Tobacco control, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.
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Who cites it
8 citing papers in PubMed.
- Tobacco industry corporate social responsibility activities and other interference after ratification of a strong tobacco law in Ethiopia.Tobacco control · 2024Article
- Adopting a WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control-Based Tobacco Control Law in Ethiopia: Sustained Transnational Health Advocacy and Multi-Sectoral Institutionalized Support.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2024Article
- Tobacco industry strategies to influence the regulation of new and emerging tobacco and nicotine products in Latin America and the Caribbean.Revista panamericana de salud publica = Pan American journal of public health · 2024Article
- 'They have a right to participate as a stakeholder': Article 5.3 implementation and government interactions with the tobacco industry in Ethiopia.Tobacco control · 2022Article
- Firm foundation or neglected cornerstone? The paradox of Article 5.3 implementation and the challenge of strengthening tobacco control governance.Tobacco control · 2022Article
- Tobacco supply and demand strategies used in African countries.Bulletin of the World Health Organization · 2021Article
- Measuring the illicit cigarette market in Mexico: a cross validation of two methodologies.Tobacco control · 2021Article
- Tracking and tracing the tobacco industry: potential tobacco industry influence over the EU's system for tobacco traceability and security features.Tobacco control · 2020Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
Abstract
objectiveAnalyse the transnational tobacco companies' (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol).
methodsReview of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods.
resultsFacing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments' law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs' claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade.
conclusionGovernments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.