Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30601806›Full record

ArticlePLoS biology2019

Contest models highlight inherent inefficiencies of scientific funding competitions.

Kevin Gross, Carl T Bergstrom

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PLoS biology, 2019. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 29 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
29citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

29 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
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  5. Review
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  11. Alternative models of funding curiosity-driven research.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  12. Article
  13. Shifting the Level of Selection in Science.Perspectives on psychological science : a journal of the Association for Psychological Science · 2024
    Article
  14. Perspectives on scientific error.Royal Society open science · 2023
    Review
  15. Rethink funding by putting the lottery first.Nature human behaviour · 2023
    Article
  16. Article
  17. Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Kevin GrossDepartment of Statistics, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North Carolina, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0001-5612-7519
Carl T BergstromDepartment of Biology, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0002-2070-385X

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Scientific research funding is allocated largely through a system of soliciting and ranking competitive grant proposals. In these competitions, the proposals themselves are not the deliverables that the funder seeks, but instead are used by the funder to screen for the most promising research ideas. Consequently, some of the funding program's impact on science is squandered because applying researchers must spend time writing proposals instead of doing science. To what extent does the community's aggregate investment in proposal preparation negate the scientific impact of the funding program? Are there alternative mechanisms for awarding funds that advance science more efficiently? We use the economic theory of contests to analyze how efficiently grant proposal competitions advance science, and compare them with recently proposed, partially randomized alternatives such as lotteries. We find that the effort researchers waste in writing proposals may be comparable to the total scientific value of the research that the funding supports, especially when only a few proposals can be funded. Moreover, when professional pressures motivate investigators to seek funding for reasons that extend beyond the value of the proposed science (e.g., promotion, prestige), the entire program can actually hamper scientific progress when the number of awards is small. We suggest that lost efficiency may be restored either by partial lotteries for funding or by funding researchers based on past scientific success instead of proposals for future work.

Indexed as

Awards and PrizesEfficiencyHumansResearch PersonnelResearch Support as TopicWriting

Identifiers

PMID30601806
PMCPMC6314589

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.