Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30558323›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2018

IoT Device Security: Challenging "A Lightweight RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol Based on Physical Unclonable Function".

Ygal Bendavid, Nasour Bagheri, Masoumeh Safkhani, Samad Rostampour

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. SKINNY-Based RFID Lightweight Authentication Protocol.Sensors (Basel, Switzerland) · 2020
    Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Ygal BendavidDepartment of Management and Technology, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), Montreal, QC H2X 1L7, Canada. bendavid.ygal@uqam.ca.
Nasour BagheriElectrical Engineering Department, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran 16788-15811, Iran. NBagheri@sru.ac.ir.ORCID 0000-0002-6818-5342
Masoumeh SafkhaniComputer Engineering Department, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran 16788-15811, Iran. Safkhani@sru.ac.ir.ORCID 0000-0002-1897-0828
Samad RostampourDepartment of Management and Technology, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM), Montreal, QC H2X 1L7, Canada. samad.rostampour@iauahvaz.ac.ir.ORCID 0000-0003-0183-5993

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

With the exponential increase of Internet of things (IoT) connected devices, important security risks are raised as any device could be used as an attack channel. This preoccupation is particularly important with devices featuring limited processing power and memory capabilities for security purposes. In line with this idea, Xu et al. (2018) proposed a lightweight Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) mutual authentication protocol based on Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)-ensuring mutual tag-reader verification and preventing clone attacks. While Xu et al. claim that their security protocol is efficient to protect RFID systems, we found it still vulnerable to a desynchronization attack and to a secret disclosure attack. Hence, guidelines for the improvements to the protocol are also suggested, for instance by changing the structure of the messages to avoid trivial attacks. In addition, we provide an explicit protocol for which our formal and informal security analysis have found no weaknesses.

Indexed as

authentication protocoldesynchronization attackIoTphysical unclonable functionRFIDsecurity

Identifiers

PMID30558323
PMCPMC6308613

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.