ArticlePloS one2018
Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.
Article in PloS one, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 9 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
9 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it, 13 citations in OpenAlex.
- Biosecurity implementation in poultry farms across Europe and neighboring countries: a systematic review.Frontiers in veterinary science · 2025Pooled it
- Modeling and assessing Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) spread, epidemiological control measures, and cost.PloS one · 2026Article
- Smallholder Farmer's Knowledge and Practice Towards Farm Biosecurity Measures to Prevent Infectious Diseases in Bahir Dar City, Ethiopia.Veterinary medicine and science · 2025Article
- Potential biosecurity breaches in poultry farms: Presence of free-ranging mammals near laying-hen houses assessed through a camera-trap study.Veterinary and animal science · 2024Article
- Compliance of biosecurity practices for compartmentalization to foot-mouth disease and classical swine fever viruses in commercial swine companies from southern Brazil.Frontiers in veterinary science · 2023Article
- Dynamics of inter-farm transmission of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 integrating vehicle movements and phylogenetic information.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- Assessment of Biosecurity Status in Commercial Chicken Farms Found in Bishoftu Town, Oromia Regional State, Ethiopia.Veterinary medicine international · 2021Article
- Article
- Correction: Risk of poultry compartments for transmission of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza.PloS one · 2019Article
Corrections and comments
- Erratum issued
Authors and funding
4 authors at 1 institution in 1 country.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
When outbreaks of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) occur in OIE member countries with until then disease-free status, member countries can use 'compartmentalisation'. A compartment may be defined as a subset of farms under a common management system, complying with certain stringent surveillance, control and biosecurity measures, and based on that may receive a disease-free status. Based on this disease-free status the compartment is exempted from certain transport restrictions coming into force in case of outbreaks occurring in the country. For deciding whether a candidate compartment is granted official compartment status, it is relevant to assess the additional HPAI transmission risks that would arise due to the exemptions granted. These risks consist of both additional local transmission risks as well as the additional risk of a 'jump' of HPAI infection from one poultry area, via the compartment, to another area. Here such risk assessment is carried out using a spatial mathematical model for between-farm transmission in the Netherlands, yielding insight in the roles of compartment composition and contact structure and identify relevant evaluation criteria for granting HPAI compartment status. At the core of this model are transmission probabilities associated with indirect between-farm contacts, e.g. through feed delivery, egg collection and professional visitors. These probabilities were estimated from Dutch epidemic outbreak data in earlier work. The additional risk of a jump of HPAI from one area, via the compartment, to another area is calculated relative to the direct jump risk. The results show that additional transmission risks caused by a compartment to other farms are mainly dependent on the distance of densely populated poultry areas (DPPAs) to the nearest compartment farm. Apart from conditions on these distances, we also recommend specific routing requirements for transport and other movements within the compartment.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.