ArticleRoyal Society open science2018
Scaling the phase-planes of social dilemma strengths shows game-class changes in the five rules governing the evolution of cooperation.
Article in Royal Society open science, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. An erratum has been issued. Cited by 30 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
30 citing papers in PubMed.
- Article
- Evolution of cooperation in multichannel games on multiplex networks.PLoS computational biology · 2024Article
- Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024Article
- Article
- Effects of conservative-militant defection strategies on the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- Impact of discrepant accumulations strategy on collective cooperation in multilayer networks.Scientific reports · 2024Article
- The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Super-rational aspiration promotes cooperation in the asymmetric game with peer exit punishment and reward.Heliyon · 2023Article
- Exploring the performance of volatile mutations on evolutionary game dynamics in complex networks.Heliyon · 2023Article
- Grouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity.PLoS computational biology · 2023Article
- Article
- COVID-19 vaccine incentive scheduling using an optimally controlled reinforcement learning model.Physica D. Nonlinear phenomena · 2023Article
- Network topology and movement cost, not updating mechanism, determine the evolution of cooperation in mobile structured populations.PloS one · 2023Article
- Optimal strategies and cost-benefit analysis of the [Formula: see text]-player weightlifting game.Scientific reports · 2022Article
- Evolution of cooperation and trust in an N-player social dilemma game with tags for migration decisions.Royal Society open science · 2022Article
- Cognitive-Behavioral Differences Between Officials and Folks in China's Targeted Poverty Alleviation: An Evolutionary Game Theory Perspective.Frontiers in psychology · 2022Article
- University teachers' scientific research innovation incentive based on the three-party evolutionary game of the state, the colleges, and scientific researchers.Frontiers in psychology · 2022Article
- Bilateral costly expulsions resolve the public goods dilemma.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2021Article
- Peer pressure induced punishment resolves social dilemma on interdependent networks.Scientific reports · 2021Article
- The characteristics of average abundance function with mutation of multi-player threshold public goods evolutionary game model under redistribution mechanism.BMC ecology and evolution · 2021Article
Corrections and comments
- Erratum issued
Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Game theory has been extensively applied to help explain how cooperative behaviour is promoted in human and animal societies. How do humans and animals establish reciprocity when confronting a social dilemma? In 2006, Nowak theoretically proved that numerous mechanisms and models for evolving cooperative behaviour reported over the last few decades can be distilled into five reciprocity mechanisms (rules). Additionally, universal scaling parameters were proposed to measure two different types of dilemmas, namely, the gamble-intending dilemma (GID) and risk-averting dilemma (RAD). In this work, by drawing a RAD-GID phase-plane diagram for pair-wise games, we prove that these five rules are indeed quite different for the resolution (relaxation) of the two dilemmas. These diagrams also demonstrate whether and when game-class change (resolution of a dilemma) occurs, thus implying how defectors can be eliminated.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.