Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30429320›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2018

Indirect reciprocity with private, noisy, and incomplete information.

Christian Hilbe, Laura Schmid, Josef Tkadlec, Krishnendu Chatterjee, Martin A Nowak

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 55 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
55citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

55 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Why human societies adopt rigid moral rules: The efficiency-robustness trade-off.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. One's Actions "Aging Poorly": An Integrative Egocentric Framework for Understanding Impression Management Errors and the Challenge of Temporal Impression Management.Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc · 2026
    Review
  4. Article
  5. Promoters of cooperation in evolutionary games.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. Institutions of public judgment established by social contract and taxation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  10. Picking strategies in games of cooperation.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  11. Evolving general cooperation with a Bayesian theory of mind.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025
    Article
  12. Drivers of cooperation in social dilemmas on higher-order networks.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2025
    Article
  13. Article
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Indirect reciprocity under opinion synchronization.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
  18. Article
  19. Article
  20. Computational evolution of social norms in well-mixed and group-structured populations.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2024
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Christian HilbeInstitute of Science and Technology Austria, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria; christian.hilbe@ist.ac.at.ORCID 0000-0001-5116-955X
Laura SchmidInstitute of Science and Technology Austria, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria.ORCID 0000-0002-6978-7329
Josef TkadlecInstitute of Science and Technology Austria, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria.
Krishnendu ChatterjeeInstitute of Science and Technology Austria, 3400 Klosterneuburg, Austria.
Martin A NowakProgram for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138.ORCID 0000-0001-5489-0908

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation. When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree on each other's reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral systems. These "leading-eight" strategies can maintain cooperation and resist invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light. Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.

Indexed as

cooperationevolutionary game theoryindirect reciprocitysocial norms

Identifiers

PMID30429320
PMCPMC6275544

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.