Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30400624›Full record

ArticleInternational journal of environmental research and public health2018

Evolutionary Game Theoretic Analysis of Low Carbon Investment in Supply Chains under Governmental Subsidies.

Guang Zhu, Gaozhi Pan, Weiwei Zhang

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in International journal of environmental research and public health, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Optimal Carbon Abatement Strategy for Manufacturers under Cap-and-Trade.International journal of environmental research and public health · 2022
    Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
  5. Article
  6. Article
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Guang ZhuSchool of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, China. guangguang4992@sina.com.ORCID 0000-0003-4749-8603
Gaozhi PanSchool of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, China. 20161307043@nuist.edu.cn.
Weiwei ZhangChina Institute of Manufacturing Development, Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology, Nanjing 210044, China. zhangww@nuist.edu.cn.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

With the rapid development of global industry and economy, excessive carbon dioxide emission has emerged as a critical issue in both developed and developing countries. Using an evolutionary game framework in which game players can adjust their strategies constantly, this paper investigates how to optimize the strategy of low carbon investment for suppliers and manufacturers in supply chains, and discuss the impacts of various factors on evolutionarily stable strategies. Additionally, we examine an incentive mechanism based on governmental subsidies to eliminate free riding and motivate co-investment. Furthermore, a case study and numerical examples are provided for illustration and simulation purposes, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. Our analytical results show that the strategic choice of low carbon investment is correlated with profit growth coefficients, investment costs and profits from free riding. Investment costs have more significant impacts than other factors on evolutionarily stable strategies, while profit growth coefficients are more important at initial stages in the evolutionary process. The incentive mechanism based on governmental subsidies is an effective solution to motivate co-investment, and governments should take some measures to improve the assess accuracy and supervisory efficiency of investment strategy.

Indexed as

CarbonGame TheoryInvestmentsCosts and Cost AnalysisFinancing, GovernmentCarbonevolutionary gamefree ridinggovernmental subsidieslow carbon investmentsupply chain

Identifiers

PMID30400624
PMCPMC6266143

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.