Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30397016›Full record

Observational studyThe British journal of general practice : the journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners2018

Influence of financial and reputational incentives on primary care performance: a longitudinal study.

Thomas Allen, William Whittaker, Evangelos Kontopantelis, Matt Sutton

Registry-linked trialAbstract readObservational Study
In one paragraph

Observational study in The British journal of general practice : the journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. It is linked to trial NCT06829589 (Assessment of the Retrieval of Economic Incentives and Information Provision on Quality-of-care Indicators for Primary Care Professionals), which is not on this map. Cited by 11 papers, 2 of them syntheses that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
11citing papers in PubMed, 2 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

NCT06829589 naactive not recruitingnot on this mapstarted 2025, after this paper: background citation

Assessment of the Retrieval of Economic Incentives and Information Provision on Quality-of-care Indicators for Primary Care Professionals

TypeinterventionalSponsorFundacio d'Investigacio en Atencio Primaria Jordi Gol i GurinaRan2025 to 2026Enrolled1,614ConditionsHypertension, Diabetes, Atrium, FibrillationArmsRemoval of economic incentives linked to 7 quality-of-care indicators, Removal of information provision linked to 7 quality-of-care indicators
3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

11 citing papers in PubMed, 2 syntheses or guidelines pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Pooled it
  3. Trial
  4. Financial incentives and information provision for post-pandemic primary care quality recovery: a longitudinal study in Catalonia.The British journal of general practice : the journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners · 2026
    Article
  5. Practitioners' views on the measurement and management of postural hypotension in general practice: a qualitative inquiry.The British journal of general practice : the journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners · 2025
    Article
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Article
  9. How do family doctors respond to reduced waiting times for cancer diagnosis in secondary care?The European journal of health economics : HEPAC : health economics in prevention and care · 2024
    Article
  10. Article
  11. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Thomas AllenManchester Centre for Health Economics.
William WhittakerManchester Centre for Health Economics.
Evangelos KontopantelisSchool of Health Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester.
Matt SuttonSchool of Health Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundThe Quality and Outcomes Framework has generated reputational as well as financial rewards for general practices because the number of quality points a practice receives is publicly reported. These rewards vary across diseases and practices, and over time.

aimTo determine the relative effects on performance of the financial and reputational rewards resulting from a pay-for-performance programme. DESIGN AND

settingObservational study of the published performance on 42 indicators of 8929 practices in England between 2004 and 2013.

methodThe authors calculated the revenue offered (financial reward, measured in £100s) and the points offered (reputational reward) per additional patient treated for each indicator for each practice in each year. Fixed-effects multivariable regression models were used to estimate whether the percentage of eligible patients treated responded to changes in these financial and reputational rewards.

resultsBoth the offered financial rewards and reputational rewards had small but statistically significant associations with practice performance. The effect of the financial reward on performance decreased from 0.797 percentage points per £100 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.614 to 0.979) in 2004, to 0.092 (95% CI = 0.045 to 0.138) in 2013. The effect of the reputational reward increased from -0.121 percentage points per quality point (95% CI = -0.220 to -0.022) in 2004, to 0.209 (95% CI = 0.147 to 0.271) in 2013.

conclusionIn the short term, general practices were more sensitive to revenue than reputational rewards. In the long term, general practices appeared to divert their focus towards the reputational reward, once benchmarks of performance became established.

Indexed as

Physician Incentive PlansBenchmarkingEnglandHealth Services ResearchHumansLongitudinal StudiesMeta-Analysis as TopicMotivationPhysicians, Primary CarePrimary Health CareQuality Indicators, Health CareQuality of Health CareReimbursement, Incentivefinancial incentivesgeneral practicelongitudinal studypay-for-performancereputational incentives

Identifiers

PMID30397016
PMCPMC6255225

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
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Registered trials

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.