Securing Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks: Breaking and Fixing a Three-Factor Authentication Protocol.

Heterogeneous wireless sensor networks (HWSNs) are employed in many real-time applications, such as Internet of sensors (IoS), Internet of vehicles (IoV), healthcare monitoring, and so on. As wireless sensor nodes have constrained computing, storage and communication capabilities, designing energy-efficient authentication protocols is a very important issue in wireless sensor network security. Recently, Amin et al. presented an untraceable and anonymous three-factor authentication (3FA) scheme for HWSNs and argued that their protocol is efficient and can withstand the common security threats in this sort of networks. In this article, we show how their protocol is not immune to user impersonation, de-synchronization and traceability attacks. In addition, an adversary can disclose session key under the typical assumption that sensors are not tamper-resistant. To overcome these drawbacks, we improve the Amin et al.'s protocol. First, we informally show that our improved scheme is secure against the most common attacks in HWSNs in which the attacks against Amin et al.'s protocol are part of them. Moreover, we verify formally our proposed protocol using the BAN logic. Compared with the Amin et al.'s scheme, the proposed protocol is both more efficient and more secure to be employed which renders the proposal suitable for HWSN networks.