Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30380062›Full record

ArticleHealth policy and planning2018

Does payment for performance increase performance inequalities across health providers? A case study of Tanzania.

Peter Binyaruka, Bjarne Robberstad, Gaute Torsvik, Josephine Borghi

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health policy and planning, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 10 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
10citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

10 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Peter BinyarukaCentre for International Health, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway.
Bjarne RobberstadCentre for International Health, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway.
Gaute TorsvikDepartment of Global Health and Development, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.
Josephine BorghiDepartment of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 15-17 Tavistock Place, London, UK.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The impact of payment-for-performance (P4P) schemes in the health sector has been documented, but there has been little attention to the distributional effects of P4P across health facilities. We examined the distribution of P4P payouts over time and assessed whether increased service coverage due to P4P differed across facilities in Tanzania. We used two service outcomes that improved due to P4P [facility-based deliveries and provision of antimalarials during antenatal care (ANC)], to also assess whether incentive design matters for performance inequalities. We used data from 150 facilities from intervention and comparison areas in January 2012 and 13 months later. Our primary data were gathered through facility survey and household survey, while data on performance payouts were obtained from the programme administrator. Descriptive inequality measures were used to examine the distribution of payouts across facility subgroups. Difference-in-differences regression analyses were used to identify P4P differential effects on the two service coverage outcomes across facility subgroups. We found that performance payouts were initially higher among higher-level facilities (hospitals and health centres) compared with dispensaries, among facilities with more medical commodities and among facilities serving wealthier populations, but these inequalities declined over time. P4P had greater effects on coverage of institutional deliveries among facilities with low baseline performance, serving middle wealth populations and located in rural areas. P4P effects on antimalarials provision during ANC was similar across facilities. Performance inequalities were influenced by the design of incentives and a range of facility characteristics; however, the nature of the service being targeted is also likely to have affected provider response. Further research is needed to examine in more detail the effects of incentive design on outcomes and researchers should be encouraged to report on design aspects in their evaluations of P4P and systematically monitor and report subgroup effects across providers.

Indexed as

Socioeconomic FactorsAntimalarialsDelivery, ObstetricFemaleHealth ExpendituresHealth FacilitiesHumansPregnancyPrenatal CareReimbursement, IncentiveSurveys and QuestionnairesTanzaniaAntimalarials

Identifiers

PMID30380062
PMCPMC6263023

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.