ArticleScientific reports2018
Cost-effective external interference for promoting the evolution of cooperation.
Article in Scientific reports, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 13 papers.
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Who cites it
13 citing papers in PubMed.
- Article
- Evolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024Article
- Emergence of cooperation in the one-shot Prisoner's dilemma through Discriminatory and Samaritan AIs.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2024Article
- Cost Optimisation of Individual-Based Institutional Reward Incentives for Promoting Cooperation in Finite Populations.Bulletin of mathematical biology · 2024Article
- The paradigm of tax-reward and tax-punishment strategies in the advancement of public resource management dynamics.Proceedings. Biological sciences · 2024Article
- Cost optimisation of hybrid institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations.Journal of mathematical biology · 2023Article
- Does Spending More Always Ensure Higher Cooperation? An Analysis of Institutional Incentives on Heterogeneous Networks.Dynamic games and applications · 2023Article
- Optimization of institutional incentives for cooperation in structured populations.Journal of the Royal Society, Interface · 2023Article
- Article
- Cost efficiency of institutional incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations.Proceedings. Mathematical, physical, and engineering sciences · 2021Article
- Article
- Mediating artificial intelligence developments through negative and positive incentives.PloS one · 2021Article
- Conditional cooperation in group contests.PloS one · 2020Article
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
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Abstract
The problem of promoting the evolution of cooperative behaviour within populations of self-regarding individuals has been intensively investigated across diverse fields of behavioural, social and computational sciences. In most studies, cooperation is assumed to emerge from the combined actions of participating individuals within the populations, without taking into account the possibility of external interference and how it can be performed in a cost-efficient way. Here, we bridge this gap by studying a cost-efficient interference model based on evolutionary game theory, where an exogenous decision-maker aims to ensure high levels of cooperation from a population of individuals playing the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma, at a minimal cost. We derive analytical conditions for which an interference scheme or strategy can guarantee a given level of cooperation while at the same time minimising the total cost of investment (for rewarding cooperative behaviours), and show that the results are highly sensitive to the intensity of selection by interference. Interestingly, we show that a simple class of interference that makes investment decisions based on the population composition can lead to significantly more cost-efficient outcomes than standard institutional incentive strategies, especially in the case of weak selection.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.