Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30316233›Full record

ArticleInternational journal of health policy and management2018

Retaining Doctors in Rural Bangladesh: A Policy Analysis.

Taufique Joarder, Lal B Rawal, Syed Masud Ahmed, Aftab Uddin, Timothy G Evans

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in International journal of health policy and management, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 25 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
25citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

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3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

25 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Taufique JoarderJames P Grant School of Public Health, BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Lal B RawalHERD International, Kathmandu, Nepal.
Syed Masud AhmedCentre of Excellence for Health Systems and Universal Health Coverage, James P Grant School of Public Health, BRAC University, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Aftab UddinInternational Center for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b), Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Timothy G EvansHealth Nutrition and Population, Human Development Network, The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundRetaining doctors in rural areas is a challenge in Bangladesh. In this study, we analyzed three rural retention policies: career development programs, compulsory services, and schools outside major cities - in terms of context, contents, actors, and processes.

methodsSeries of group discussions between policy-makers and researchers prompted the selection of policy areas, which were analyzed using the policy triangle framework. We conducted document and literature reviews (1971-2013), key informant interviews (KIIs) with relevant policy elites (n=11), and stakeholder analysis/position-mapping.

resultsIn policy-1, we found, applicants with relevant expertise were not leveraged in recruitment, promotions were often late and contingent on post-graduation. Career tracks were porous and unplanned: people without necessary expertise or experience were deployed to high positions by lateral migration from unrelated career tracks or ministries, as opposed to vertical promotion. Promotions were often politically motivated. In policy-2, females were not ensured to stay with their spouse in rural areas, health bureaucrats working at district and sub-district levels relaxed their monitoring for personal gain or political pressure. Impractical rural posts were allegedly created to graft money from applicants in exchange for recruitment assurance. Compulsory service was often waived for political affiliates. In policy-3, we found an absence of clear policy documents obligating establishment of medical colleges in rural areas. These were established based on political consideration (public sector) or profit motives (private sector).

conclusionFour cross-cutting themes were identified: lack of proper systems or policies, vested interest or corruption, undue political influence, and imbalanced power and position of some stakeholders. Based on findings, we recommend, in policy-1, applicants with relevant expertise to be recruited; recruitment should be quick, customized, and transparent; career tracks (General Health Service, Medical Teaching, Health Administration) must be clearly defined, distinct, and respected. In policy-2, facilities must be ensured prior to postings, female doctors should be prioritized to stay with the spouse, field bureaucrats should receive non-practising allowance in exchange of strict monitoring, and no political interference in compulsory service is assured. In policy-3, specific policy guidelines should be developed to establish rural medical colleges. Political commitment is a key to rural retention of doctors.

Indexed as

Attitude of Health PersonnelJob SatisfactionBangladeshHealth WorkforceHumansPersonnel TurnoverRural Health ServicesRural PopulationSalaries and Fringe BenefitsBangladeshHealth Systems ResearchHuman Resources for HealthPolicy AnalysisRural Retention

Identifiers

PMID30316233
PMCPMC6186485

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.