Evidence map›Paper›PMID 30286188›Full record

ArticlePLoS pathogens2018

Inoculating science against potential pandemics and information hazards.

Kevin M Esvelt

Open access · goldAbstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PLoS pathogens, 2018. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 20 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
20citing papers in PubMed
1.1field-weighted citation impact, top 22% of its field
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

20 citing papers in PubMed, 33 citations in OpenAlex.

  1. Article
  2. Functional and antigenic constraints on the Nipah virus fusion protein.Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2026
    Article
  3. Protein engineering: status report.Protein engineering, design & selection : PEDS · 2026
    Review
  4. Functional and antigenic constraints on the Nipah virus fusion protein.bioRxiv : the preprint server for biology · 2026
    Article
  5. Review
  6. Article
  7. Article
  8. Review
  9. Article
  10. Article
  11. Practical Questions for Securing Nucleic Acid Synthesis.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2024
    Article
  12. Article
  13. Review
  14. Article
  15. Article
  16. Article
  17. Review
  18. Next Steps for Access to Safe, Secure DNA Synthesis.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2019
    Article
  19. Article
  20. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author at 1 institution in 1 country.

Kevin M EsveltMIT Media Lab, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America.ORCID 0000-0001-8797-3945
Massachusetts Institute of Technology · US

Funding

Sculpting the Enteric Microbiota with CRISPR-Cas SystemsR00DK102669 · NIDDK · MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY · PI ESVELT, KEVIN · 2016 to 2017
$496k
NIDDK NIH HHS R00 DK102669
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The recent de novo assembly of horsepox is an instructive example of an information hazard: published methods enabling poxvirus synthesis led to media coverage spelling out the implications, efficiently disseminating true information that might be used to cause harm. Whether or not the benefits justified the risks, the horsepox saga provides ample reason to upgrade the current system for screening synthesized DNA for hazardous sequences, which does not cover the majority of firms and cannot reliably prevent the assembly of potentially pandemic pathogens. An upgraded system might leverage one-way encryption to confidentially scrutinize virtually all commercial production by a cooperative international network of servers whose integrity can be verified by third parties. Funders could support participating institutions to ease the transition or outright subsidize the market to make clean DNA cheaper, while boycotts by journals, institutions, and funders could ensure compliance and require hardware-level locks on future DNA synthesizers. However, the underlying problem is that security and safety discussions among experts typically follow potentially hazardous events rather than anticipating them. Changing norms and incentives to favor preregistration and advisory peer review of planned experiments could test alternatives to the current closeted research model in select areas of science. Because the fields of synthetic mammalian virology and especially gene drive research involve technologies that could be unilaterally deployed and may self-replicate in the wild, they are compelling candidates for initial trials of early-stage peer review.

Indexed as

Information DisseminationOrthopoxvirusBiohazard ReleaseBiomedical ResearchHumansPandemicsPoxviridae InfectionsRisk AssessmentSafety Management

Identifiers

PMID30286188
PMCPMC6171951
OpenAlexW2895239334

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.